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FEDERAL RESTRAINTS ON INTERSTATE NATURAL
GAS SUPPLY AND MARKET EXPANSION
PHILIP M. MARSTON*
FREDERICK MORING*

I.

*

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to analyze one element of federal
energy policy-the federal government's actions limiting the ability of the interstate natural gas industry to overcome the shortage
of deliverable domestic gas supply and to reacquire the characteristics of a growth industry in today's rapidly changing energy marketplace. Before proceeding with this analysis, however, a few words
of perspective on the current energy policy formulation process are
are in order.
On April 20, 1977, President Jimmy Carter fulfilled his inaugural pledge to set forth a National Energy Policy during his first 90
days in office. This Policy (known as the National Energy Plan or
"NEP") was announced in a nationally televised speech and was
shortly thereafter embodied in a voluminous bill sent to Congress.
The bill, H. R. 8444, was passed largely intact by the U.S. House
of Representatives on August 5, 1977. Since that time, a substantially altered version of the bill has been passed by the Senate and
a House-Senate Conference Committee has been unable to come to
agreement, despite serious and sincere efforts by all concerned.
While it thus appears that the 95th Congress, like the three immediately preceding it, has not yet produced legislation embodying
a coherent, long-term national energy policy, it does not follow that
federal energy policy is non-existent. The void left by Congressional
inaction is being filled by Executive Branch and regulatory agency
decisions on a continuing basis. Given its more than $10 billion budget, its comprehensive power over energy conservation and over the
pricing and distribution of petroleum products, in addition to its ratemaking, rationing and licensing jurisdiction with respect to the interstate natural gas and electric industry, the recently organized Department of Energy can and does implement energy policy. One of
the chief attributes of federal energy policy formulation during Congressional stalemate over the last several years, however, is that
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many elements of existing or ongoing policy can only be inferred.
Thus, in the absence of any clearly announced policy goals or objectives, some components of energy policy can only be discerned by
analyzing and piecing together a series of individual acts or statements of policy, no single one of which can be viewed as a definitive,
or perhaps even deliberate expression of energy policy. The topic
chosen for this note-gas supply and load growth policy-is one of
those policy elements where this form of analysis is required. The
approach to this analysis is in three parts: (a) a review of recent
decisions limiting interstate supply and market growth efforts by
two federal agencies, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and its
successor, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and
the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) and its successor, the
Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA); (b) a review of several
energy policy goals proposed to Congress by the Carter Administration which also limit gas supply and gas industry load growth activities; and (c) an evaluation or assessment of the legal and factual
predicates of both the inferred regulatory policy and the proposed
Administration policy. The concluding section outlines an alternative
approach to policy-making for gaseous fuels.
II.

FEDERAL AGENCY ACTION RESTRAINING INTERSTATE
GAS SUPPLY IMPROVEMENT AND/OR LOAD GROWTH

This article does not contend that federal agency actions of recent
years have been fully consistent with any specific set of goals and
objectives, either inferred, announced, or otherwise. The authors do
contend, however, that the FPC, FERC, and the FEA (now Economic
Regulatory Administration or ERA) have taken a series of steps
which have inhibited the ability of the interstate gas industry-that
portion of the gas pipeline and distribution industry located outside
the major producing states of Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas-to
overcome the shortage of deliverable gas supply and to supply even
a modest portion of the nation's constantly expanding energy requirements.' In this section, we identify and discuss the principal decisions and actions by which this restraint has been imposed.2
B.A., Dickinson College (1917) : J.D., University of Virginia (1971).
B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute (1957); J.D., George Washington, University
(1961).
1.
Wellhead price regulation since 1954 has played a major role in creating current
**

shortages.

See,

e.g., R.

HELMs,
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REGULATION:

AN

EVALUATION

OF FPC
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CONTROLS (1974); Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and Regulation of Natural Gas Producers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 941 (1973). Arguments for and against continued
regulation, however, turn in large part on differing political value judgments. For an
analysis and assessment of how various pricing strategies interrelate with several basic
public policy goals, see Moring & Wilderotter, Natural Gas: The Policy-Pricing Matrix
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L. INST. 737

(1977).

This article, however, addresses non-price re-

Ftrictive policies only and takes no position on the regulation-deregulatioi debate.
2. We do not ignore the vnrious regulatory measures taken to stimulate domestic

gas
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A.

ACTIONS IMPEDING INDUSTRY'S SELF-HELP EFFORTS

1. The "Finder's Keepers" Problem
As interstate pipeline companies began to curtail firm service to
their distribution company customers in the early 1970's, a number
of state-regulated gas distributors obtained authority to form producing subsidiaries to explore for and develop gas which would offset
declining pipeline deliveries. 3 Transportation of these volumes by an
interstate pipeline company from the producing field to the distributor's service area is subject to FERC licensing jurisdiction. While the
Commission is without authority to order the pipeline to deliver the
volumes to someone other than the distributor, it does have authority
to deny certification on the basis of the end-use proposed by the dis4
tributor.
In a series of early decisions, the Commission promptly certificated the transportation of such "self-help" gas developed by distributor-owned exploration companies. 5 Since this production was not
owned by the pipeline company, it was not treated as part of the pipeline's supply for the purposes of computing curtailment allocations.
Accordingly, the enterprising distribution company could receive not
only its share of pipeline deliveries based on a Commission-approved
curtailment plan, but could supplement its supply with its own production. By allowing interstate pipeline companies to carry the gas
back to the distributor's service area, the Commission implicitly
recognized what might be termed the "finder's keepers" principle.
In an order issued January 11, 1977, in the NOMECO proceeding,O however, the Commission refused to allow the sale and transportation of natural gas from a distributor's producing affiliate to
the parent. The Commission reasoned that the distributor (Consumers
supply. These measures include inter alia (a)
the provision for 60-day emergency sales
under 18 C.F.R. § 2.68; (b) the Order No. 533 policy allowing pipelines to transport
natural gas purchased directly from producers by high-priority industrial customers, revised by FERC Order No. 2, (Feb. 1, 1978) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 2.79) ; and of course
(c)
the decision to triple the ceiling price for sales of "new" natural gas from roughly
$.50 per MCF to over $1.42 per MCF in Opinion No. 770, The Second National Natural
Gas Rate Cases, (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. den. 46 U.S.L.W. 3539 (1978).
Except for the
decision as to price (the effects of which cannot yet be definitely assessed), these actions have been in the nature of limited short-term palliatives that are far outweighed, by
the restrictive measures detailed below.
3. Since gas distribution companies are regulated public utilities, their investments
and participation in such producing ventures are subject to review and approval by the
approprate state public utility commisson.
4. FPC Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Corporation,
365
U.S.
1 (1961) (usually
known as the "Transco X-20" case).
5. ,See, e.g., Op. Nos. 668 & 668-A, Northern Michigan Exploration Co., 50 F.P.C. 1143
and 50 F.P.C. 1788 (1973) (transportation for Consumers Power Company); Op. No. 678,
Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 50 F.P.C. 1811 (1973) (transportation for Elizabethtown Gas Company); and Findings and Order issued in Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., Docket No. CP74-150, 51 F.P.C. 1902 (1974) (transportation for Public Service
Electric and Gas Company).
6. Order Reversing Initial Decision, Issued In Michigan Gas Storage Co., Docket Nos.
CP74-322 (Jan. 11, 1977) ; Order Granting Rehearing (Nov. 10, 1977).
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Power Company) had less need for the supply than the interstate
pipeline supplier that would otherwise receive much of the gas.
A number of parties filed objections to the ruling, arguing that
the order in effect commandeered the gas resulting from the company's self-help efforts and would take away all incentive for distributors generally to undertake such efforts.7 On rehearing, the Commission reversed its course and granted the necessary certificates,
but on the narrow ground that it lacked adequate evidence in the
record that the comparative needs of the other customers were in fact
greater than those of Consumers Power. Moreover, the Commission
cautioned that in the future the parent company would be required
to demonstrate its actual need for the supplemental supplies as compared to other customers of the transporting pipeline.
Any additional reserves to be delivered to Consumers will require additional certificate authorization during which the applicants will have the burden of presenting the scope of enduse analysis detailed above. . . If Consumers subsequently
seeks to purchase such additional gas, it must prove its case
starting with a clean slate, not an open-ended transportation
certificate in place.,
The order further explained that de novo proceedings would
be required for each additional application "because the Commission
should retain the flexibility to respond to any changes in its policy
concerning distributor participation in interstate gas production."
Although the Commission eventually allowed Consumers Power
to receive its affiliate's production, the limited grounds for approval
and the imposition of the comparative needs approach for future applications leaves the finder's-keepers principle surrounded by considerable uncertainty and raises the possibility that gas-poor competitors may successfully "raid" supplemental supplies obtained by
more aggressive companies.' 0 Under the rationale announced by the
Commission in NOMECO, all that might be required is a sufficient
7. In addition, the initial order denying certificates relied' in large part on the fact
that Consumers Power was also receiving gas from its non-jurisdictional SNG facility.
The initial order thus would, have discouraged self-help from two independent sources.
8. Order Granting Rehearing, supra note 6, at 8.
9. Id.
at 9. Indications from the discussion of the Commission concerning the case
indicated that some commissioners may adopt an even more restrictive position in the
future. Chairman Curtis expressed particular concern that, by allowing Consumers to
receive its affiliate's production, the Commission was
opening up the vise by which distributor companies can unevenly obtain,
supply security vis-a-vis other distribution companies feeding off the same
interstate natural gas supply mechanism. . . . I think I waint to say "No,
distribution companies, we don't want that investment in, the offshore if the
consequence of it is to acquire gas independent of the general needs of the
Interstate market."
THRE OPEN MEETING REPORT 2 (J.S. Jaffee, ed. 1977).
10. Presumably, the "raider" would be required to pay for the diverted gas. In today's gas markets, however, the availability of gas is more important than monetary

compensation.
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showing of significantly greater need. The inequity would be compounded by the fact that it is the more aggressive company's consumers who lose the most by being deprived of gas supplies which
they have paid for through higher utility rates. Moreover, future expenditures for supplemental supplies will hardly be approved by state
regulatory commissions if the gas supply benefits are diverted to
other users.
2.

Expansion of Gas Storage Facilities

Increasing use of storage facilities is a simple and relatively inexpensive way to make gas available for new customers. Since pipeline supplies of gas are usually available to distributors on a yearround basis, ,if
the distributor is unable to take full contract entitlements," any gas not taken is sold to some other customer. This usually
involves a double loss to the distributor, for not only does the distributor not receive the gas, but the company continues: to pay demand charges regardless of whether full demand entitlements are
taken or not. Accordingly, it is sound operating practice to seek markets for this "valley gas"-usually interruptible industrial or commercial customers that rely on alternate fuels during the remainder
of the year.
By expanding storage facilities to hold the valley gas for increased peak-season deliveries, however, the distributor secures
greater protection from curtailment for his temperature-sensitive requirements and may also have available sufficient volumes to serve
new high priority customers, thereby upgrading his load. Underground
storage capacity has increased rapidly throughout the 1970's, rising
from some 4.9 TCF in 1969 to roughly 6.9 TCF in 1976, with the
maximum daily sendout rising in 1976 to over 35 BCF.12 Liquefied
natural gas storage capacity has also been expanded and now stands
at over 60 BCF. Daily deliverability from these facilities is estimated
13
at around 7 BCF.
When storage facilities are used in interstate commerce, they become subject to FERC jurisdiction. 1' In recent years, however, the
11.

Or maximum volumes available under the approved curtailment plan.

12.

AMERICAN GAS

ASSOC.,

GAS

FACTS

1976 at

44,

46

[hereinafter

cited

as AGA, GAS

FACTS 1976]. The abbreviations of MCF (thousand cubic feet), EICF (billion cubic feet),
and TCF (trillion cubic feet) are standard. The importance of these volumes is underscored by the fact that maximum day sendout for 25 major Interstate transmission companies in 1976 was approximately 58 BCF. Fully half of Columbia Gas Transmission
Corporation's peak-day sendout now comes from storage.
13. Id.
14. Plursuant to the Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. 95-91, 91 Stat.
5G5 (1977) [hcreinafter cited as DOE Act] the FERC on October 1, 1977, assumed the
certification powers and responsibilities which the Federal' Power Commission had exercised under Sections 4. 5. and 7 of the Natural Gas Act. Although most of the storage
cases discussed here were actually decided by the Federal Power Commission, the new
FERC has given no indication of a, change in policy.

380
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Commission has refused to certificate new storage facilities where the
purpose was to allow the attachment of new customers. In Opinion
No. 810, Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company, (July 7, 1977),
an interstate pipeline proposed expanding its storage capabilities in
order to allow increased peak-day deliveries to certain of its distributor customers. The additional volumes were designed to permit
the distributors to provide additional service for high priority loads.
The Commission rejected the application, reasoning as follows:
In this time of gas shortages it is inappropriate and contrary
to the public interest to allow the attachment of new high
priority customers where there are alternative means available to those new customers and where the Commission may
feasibly take action to limit the growth of these distributors
through its transportation jurisdiction ....
There is simply no
rational basis to encourage new customers.' 5
More recently, the Commission implicitly affirmed the antigrowth
policy of Opinion No. 810 in an order setting hearing on a proposal
by Northern Natural Gas Company to develop additional storage
capacity.' 8
[B]ecause growth is a factor in these proceedings, we believe
the hearing established below should address the question of
whether Northern should be permitted to increase its storage
to satisfy additional demands represented by distributor
growth and, if the question is answered negatively, what conditions can be attached to any permanent certificate issued in
these proceedings to prohibit such use.' 7
The Commission then set forth a list of specific questions to be
addressed in the hearing, cautioning that "[r]esponses to these issues
should give consideration to the Commission's determination in
Opinion No. 810. .... ,,18
In marked contrast, the Commission summarily approved a recent exchange transaction in which the exchanged gas was to be
liquefied for storage during the summer months and regasified and
made available for delivery during the winter for service to existing
high priority customers. The Commission noted merely that the re15. Op. No. 810, Michignn-Wisconsin Pipelne Company, et al., F.P.C. 23-24 (July
7, 1977). Although the Commission declined to impose a condition flatly barring the use
of new storage capacity for attaching new load, the rationale for the decision was that
such a condition would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Id. at 17-19..
16. Order
Providing
for Formal Hearing,
Issued
in
Northern
Natural Gas Co.,
Docket No. CP77-193 (Sept. 19, 1977).
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id. at 6.. See also the Initial Decision in Northern Natural Gas Co., Docket Nos.
CP76-52 (May 19, 1977) denying certification of a proposed LNG storage facility pr!marily on the grouinds that the new capacity would be used by Northern Natural's dIstributor customers toy,'r\e
new high priority customors.
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delivered gas would "ensure continuation of services to high priority

customers and would not be used by Iowa Electric to attach new sales
or upgrade load."' 19
3.

Certification and Curtailment Proceedings

In curtailment and certification proceedings, Commission policy
respecting supplemental supplies and load growth has not been entirely consistent. In Opinion No. 773, Northern Natural Gas Company
(August 13, 1976), the Commission declared flatly:
In general .. . a pipeline presently curtailing existing customers should not be authorized to attach new customers re-

gardless of the priority of use to which the new customers
would put any natural gas which they receive. In the absence
of some compelling public interest consideration, existing cus-

tomers should not be cut off in order that new customers may
receive service
who had never previously received natural gas
0
deliveries.2

Accordingly, the Commission denied certification for a number of
sales measuring stations which would have made very limited vol21
umes of gas available for certain high-priority purposes.
In curtailment proceedings, however, the Commission has followed some policies designed to allow or even encourage growth on
curtailing pipeline systems.2

2

For example, the Commission has con-

sistently required that a fixed base period be used in computing customer entitlements. 23
19. Findings and Order issued in Northern Natural Gas Co., Docket No. CP77-397 at 2
(Sept. 19, 1977). See also Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. of America, Docket No. CP77-517
(Sept. 19, 1977) In which the Commission conditioned approval of a storage project on
the pipeline's submitting annual reports of any increase in, Priority I load so as to allow
the Commission to closely monitor load growth; and the Initial Decision Issued In Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co., Docket Nos. CP76-255 at 16 (Nov. 11, 1977).
20. Northern Natural Gas Co., Docket No. CP77-397 at 2-3 (emphasis added).
21. Similarly, in approving a proposed curtailment plan on the Montana-Dakota Utilities Company system that provided for the addition of up to 4,000 new connections during
1978, a Federal Power Commission Administrative Law Judge warned:
Nothing herein is a determination upon the merits that any growth whatsoever should be approved for a curtailing pipeline. Assuming the correctness of Stafl's position that no growth whatsoever should exist, in the Procedural posture of this proceeding the short-term limited. growth provision is
the farthest we can advance toward the no-growth goal for the period which
the provision will cover.
Initial Decision issued in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., Docket Nos. RP76-81 at 4 (Apr.
19, 1977) (emphasis added).
22,. For an excellent discussion of the development of Federal Power Commission policy
regarding pipeline curtailment plans, see Muys, Federal Power Commission Allocation of
Natural Gas Suppli, Shortage: Prorationing, Priorities and Perplexity, 20 ROCKY MT.MTN.
L INST. 301 (1975). For a more comprehensive discussion of the curtailment problem,
see

WILLRICi,

ADMINISTRATION

OF

ENERGY

SHORTAGES:

NATURAL

GAS

AND

ch. 2-4 (1976).
23. Fixed base periods have been aDnlied In imnlementing curtailment plans
continental Gas Pipeline Corp., Op. Nos. 778 & 778-A (Oct. 8, 1976 & Dec.
Southern Natural Gas Co., Op. Nos. 747 and 747-B (Nov. 20, 1975 & May 21,
FERC Op. No. 5 (Nov. 17, 1977) (index of requirements approach based on

PETROLEUM

for Trans8, 1976)*
1976) and
fixed data
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Since a fixed base period approach does not take into account
supplemental sources of supply attached by a distribution company
subsequent to the base period, it protects any new load attached by
distribution companies and served by such supplies. In effect, although the portion of a customer's requirements served from traditional pipeline supplies under the curtailment plan may decine, supplemental supplies may be added without jeopardizing the company's
curtailment allocation. This tendency is balanced, however, by the
fact that a fixed base period approach also disregards service requirements attached subsequent to the end of the base period. Accordingly, if a distributor sought to "upgrade" its load by attaching
more high-priority customers, curtailment under a fixed base period
approach would refuse to recognize the new, high-priority load, resulting in a decreasing portion of its actual requirements being supplied under its pipeline supplier's curtailment plan. Moreover, to the
extent that volumetric limitations are imposed at historical levels
(i.e. actual takes in the base year) rather than based on contract entitlements, the effect is to insure that volumes for adding load must
24
come from supplemental supplies.
While the actual net effect of using a fixed based period is unclear, the Commission had adopted it in large part with the intention
of protecting and encouraging the development of supplemental supplies by distributors25-a result at odds with the approach taken in
the NOMECO proceeding, supra.
In recent orders in the Cities Service Gas Company proceedings,
the Commission approved an approach which, would allow distribution companies to attach new customers to replace old customers
that converted to alternate fuel or otherwise reduced their consumption.26 This policy, which might be termed "saver's keepers", implies
base); and Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company, Op. Nos. 754 & 754-A (Feb. 27, 1976
& Aug. 17, 1976).
24. See, e.g., the Cities Service orders discussed at note 26 iitfra.
25. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Co., Op. No. 778 at 62 (Oct. 8, 1976).
A rolling base period is also unsatisfactory in terms of Commission energy
policy for it would act as a disincentive to Transco's resale customers attachin.g new supplemental supplies and as a penalty to those resale customers
which have already attached supplemental supplies. These negative effects
would result because the rolling base period would allow distributors to
upgrade their requirements without Increasing their supplemental supplies
so as to Increase their share of Transco's pipeline supply, which would result
In their use through displacement of the new supplemental supplies of other
distributors.
26. Cities Service Gas Co., Op. Nos. 805 and 805-A (June 14 1977 & August 2, 1977).
See also Orders Denying Rehearing, issued Sept. 30, 1977, and Nov. 11, 1977, and Clar.
fying Order issued Dec. 12, 1977. In Its initial order, (Op. No,. 805), the Commission aPpeared to take the opposite track by stating, that "it Is appropriate to terminate load
growth on the Cities' system effective January 1, 1978, through the imposition of an Index
of Requirements based on load attached on that date".
This result promoted Senator Eagleton of Missouri to introduce a bill, S. 1814,
designed to overturn the Commission's apparent attempt to preclude distribution company
load growth. Subsequently. however, the Commission's order on rehearing backed away
from placing an effective ban on lond gro wth, nod the bill was withdrawn.
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that a distribution company may retain in its service area any vol2
umes made available by conservation on the part of its customers.
The Cities Service orders failed to address the question of whether
a distributor could use "conservation gas" to serve lower priority
customers. Nor did the Commission attempt to rationalize the orders
with the apparent renunciation of the "finder's keepers" principle in
NOMECO.
B.

Producer Reservations of Interstate Reserves

Another Commission policy which has resulted in decreased gas
supplies for the interstate market is that of allowing producing companies to reserve offshore volumes for their own use in refineries or
for other onshore industrial purposes. Federal offshore reserves have
a "peculiar status ' '21 since they are by definition in interstate market.
Put another way, federal offshore production is the only source of
new natural gas supply which is not normally able to be diverted to
intrastate purchasers. Until changed in March of 1978, the FPC/
FERC policy discussed below, allowed a producer to reserve what
would otherwise be interstate supplies for his own use. The result
w- tl-at feiprpl domain gas was used in onshore Texas and Louisiana
industrial facilities.
The producer reservation policy was first announced in the Chandeleur Pipeline Company case.2 9 In Chandeleur, the Commission
reasoned that if the benefit derived by the producer from using its
offshore production in its own industrial facilities was greater than
that obtained from selling the gas at low rates fixed by the Commission, then the producer would have an incentive to seek out more
offshore gas. The Commission suggested that in the process, the producer might discover more gas than it could use in its own facilities,
and might make the excess available to the interstate market. Despite the lack of any factual indication that the incentive theory actually worked, Chandeleur was upheld by the D.C. Circuit as a legitimate "experiment" by the Commission."0 Under the Chandeleur doctrine, the Commission has permitted producers to have transported,
27.

The Commission explained its policy in Op. No. 805-A:
It was our intention that any distributor who reduced its consumption below
that reported in the Index of Requirements would still be entitled to delivery
of that increment of supply and could use that increment of supply to serve
new high priority load. Thus, distributors would have an incentive to encourage conservation.
Op. No. S05-A at 5.
2-. Consumers Union v. FPC, 510 F.2d 656, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
29. Op. Nos. 560, Chandeleur Pipeline Co., 42 F.P.C. 20 (1969), remanded, Public
Servtce Comm'n of New York v. F.P.C., 436 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and Op. No.
560-A, 44 F.P.C. 1747 (1970). fiff'd.
463 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
30. P'uhlie Service Comm'n of New York v. FPC, 463 F.2d S24, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
The ehain of assumptions on which the incentive theory was based was stated by the
court in this Nvn :
At the Pascagoula refinery (and perhaps at other refineries now existing or
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for their own use, well over a trillion cubic feet of gas from federal
domain reserves.3 1
The Chandeleur cases appeared to establish a "finder's-keepers"
policy for producers operating on the federal domain offshore-despite

the fact that the applicable just and reasonable rates for interstate
safes were designed to compensate the producer fully and provide all

the needed incentive. Of course, producing companies are in the business of oil and gas production and need not obtain public utility commission approval prior to engaging in offshore exploration and development. Accordingly, as appropriate as, "finder's keepers" is for
distribution or pipeline company operations, it is equally inappropriate
for producers operating in the federal offshore.
On March 7, 1977, the Commission issued Opinion No. 789, Tenneco Oil Company, et al. 2 Opinion No. 789 disclaimed further reliance
on the Chandeleur incentive theory, but issued transportation and
sales certificates to allow transportation of reserved volumes solely
on the grounds that high priority industrial process and feedstock uses

were involved. This novel theory would have effectively converted
high priority industrial users into preferred purchasers of federal
offshore ,supplies and would have been of dubious validity.3 3
On rehearing, however, the Commission determined that its policy

of allowing producers to have reserved offshore volumes transported
onshore for industrial use was no longer in the public interest and
to be built) natural gas is the least expensive and most efficient fuel to be
used In the refining of crude oil. It is, of course, le.ss expensive for Socal to
use its own natural gas at Pascagoula than to buy natural gas from other
distributors. The more cheaply Socal can acquire natural gas, the more it
will be inclined to increase its refinery's production of fuel oil, as this will
become more profitable as It becomes less expensive. The more Socal will be
inclined to produce more fuel oil at its refinery, the more it must search out
crude oil deposits to be refined. The more exploration for oil that Socal (or
others) will be doing, the more natural gas it will be discovering in its search
for crude oil. Finally, the more natural gas that Socal (or others) discovers
the more natural gas flowing into interstate commerce will be increased,
since Socal will have more natural gas than it will be be able to use itself.
Id. (footnotes deleted).
31. Through Jan. 1977, approximately 1.5 TCF of Federal Domain gas had been transported for producers' own use onshore. Approximately 145 BCF is now being transported
annually from such reversed volumes, or some 4 percent of total Federal offshore production. See, FERC Op. No. 10 at 13 (March 20, 1978).
While initially the Commission applied no end-tise conditions to such transportation certificates, in Op. No. 727, Tennessee Gas Pipe Line Co., F.P.C.(Apr. 17, 1975)
app. dismissed as moot sb nom.. Brooklyn Union Gas Company v. FERC (D.C. Cir. Feb.
9, 197S) ; and Op. No. 743, Mobil Oil Corp., -F.P.C.(Sept. 9, 1975) remnded sub
em. Public Service Comm'n of New York v. FERC (D.C. Cir. Feb. 9, 1978); use of reserved volumes for boiled fuel was proscribed. In addition, the Commission limited the
"incentive" volume to 20% of deliveries.
32. -F.P.C.(AMarch 7, 1977).
33. Since the Comnisson's rate jurisdiction extends only to sales for resale, direct
sales from a producer to an industrial user are not subject to the Commission's rate
ceilings. Direct purchasers are thus able to bid more for new supplies than interstate
pipeline companies. To the extent the Commission permits transportation of such direct
sales volumes from the federal domain offshore, industrial purchasers will be able to bid
away volumes that would otherwise be sold to interstate pieline companies for all their
purchasers. Under present surply shortag-s, this result might well constitute undue discrimination. See, e.g., note 34, FERC Op. No. 10 at 14, infra.
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announced that it would not favor such transactions in the future. 3'
Any necessary incentive for offshore production should come through
just and reasonable rates from jurisdictional sales of such gas to
interstate markets. Thus, in this limited area the FERC has now reversed prior policy and in effect opted for a policy favoring development of increased supplies for the interstate gas industry and its
consumers.
C.

NATURAL GAS IMPORTS

1.

Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)

When subjected to very low temperatures (in the neighborhood
of -259°F), vaporous natural gas condenses and becomes a liquid,
occupying approximately 1/600th of its gaseous volume. This enormous reduction in volume makes, possible transportation over long
distances in specially designed cryogenic tankers. 5 At present, the
major exporters of LNG are Algeria and Indonesia, both countries
with large gas reserves and minimal domestic markets. Potential
future supply sources include Persian Gulf producers, Nigeria, Libya,
Chile, and Trinidad.
Small volumes of LNG have been imported through a terminal in
Everett, Massachusetts, for several years. Major imports, however,
began in March 1978 at the Cove Point, Maryland terminal owned by
an affiliate of Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation.
LNG imports could become a very significant source of supplemental supply. Henry R. Linden, President of the Gas Research Institute, has estimated that LNG imports could provide from 1.5 TCF
to as much as 2.4 TCF per year by 1985.36 Even the more conservative level of imports seems very unlikely at present, however, due to
existing regulatory restrictions and the potential for delay involved.
Prior to the creation of the new Department of Energy responsibility for regulating imports of natural gas was exercised by the FPC
under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act.3 7 Under the Department of
34. FERC Op. No. 10, Tenneco Oil Co., Docket Nos. C175-45, (March, 1978), app.
docketed.
35. LNG can also be transported by truck. At least one east coast distributiorn cornpany purchased LNG from Gaz Metropolitan, Inc. of Montreal towards the end of the
1976-77 winter and effected delivery by cryogenic tank truck. See Order Authorizing the
Importation of Liquified Natural Gas, issued in New Jersey Natural Gas Co., Docket No.
RP77-265 (March 17, 1977).
36. All-out Push Urged for U.S. Gas Supply, 75 OIL & GAS J. No. 48, 76-77 (Nov. 21,
1977). Projects already approved or presently pending involve roughly 1.8 TCF in proposed annual deliveries.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 717B. In Distrigas Corp., 47 F.P.C. 752 (1972), the Commission determined that liquefied natural gas (LNG) was natural gas within the meaning of Section 3 and asserted jurisdiction over proposed LNG imports. Initially, the FPC disclaimed
Jurisdiction over the termnal facilities to be used, but later changed its mind and ordered
certification and applications to be filed covering the terminal facilities. FPC's shift of
position was afffirmed in Distrigas Corp. v. FPC, 495 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1974), but
proceeding was remanded on other grounds. The FPC has held consistently that its transportation Jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act extends only to the transportation of
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Energy Organization Act, this authority was shifted from the Commission to the Energy Secretary, who, in turn, has delegated it to the
Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA)." The FPC never developed a general policy towards LNG import projects, preferring
to consider each proposal entirely on its own merits. The result was
the evaluation of an LNG import project on a piecemeal basiswith unpredictable shifts at times.
The question of whether imports should be priced incrementally
to purchasers or "rolled-in" to the general pipeline system supply is
a case in point. Averaging the price of higher cost imports into the
overall pipeline supplies reduces the delivered price of the LNG and
thus acts as an incentive for increased imports. Requiring each increment of higher cost imports to be sold separately at the higher price,
on the other hand, tends to limit imports below the level expected if
rolled-in pricing were adopted.
Initially, the FPC approved of rolled-in pricing for LNG imports,
in effect encouraging the industry to develop more import plans
based on that approach to pricing.3 9 In the Trunkline LNG proceeding, however, decided in April 1977, the FPC ordered a project to
be restructured so as to price imports incrementally to resale customers. 40 The effect of the abrupt shift in policy was to introduce
considerable uncertainty as to whether the proposed imports could be
successfully marketed over the short term. The FPC shifted back to
rolled-in pricing on rehearing, however, recognizing that a decision
to require incremental pricing would probably undermine the financeability of the proposal.
Notwithstanding the FPC's decision to shift back to rolled-in pricing, the zig-zag path of federal policy on the pricing question is apparently not over. On December 30, 1977, the Economic Regulatory Administration of the Department of Energy issued its first LNG import
decision in the Pac Indonesia proceeding. 41 ERA noted that, in general, the Energy Department supported the concept of incremental
pricing, and that, pending formulation of a general policy in an ongoing separate proceeding 4 2 "the DOE will closely scrutinize pendnatural gas by pipeline. Accordingly, the ocean transport of LNG by tanker is not subject to FPC jurisdiction. Marathon Oil Co., Op. No. 735, (June 23, 1975). Certain, aspects
of ocean transport of LNG are, however, regulated by other Federal agencies. For example,
the United States Coast Guard exercises responsibility for routing LNG tankers into ports.
38. DOE Delegation Order 0204-4, para. 6, 42 Fed. Reg. 60726 (1977).
39. See, e.g., Columbia LNG Corp., 45 F.P.C. 723 (1972), and Columbia. LNG Corp.,
-F.P.C.(Jan. 21, 1977).
40. Trunkline LNG Co.,
-F.P.C.(Apr. 29,
1977), Order on Rehearing,
Op. No. 796-A (June 30, 1977). Tn addition, the FPC specifically "encouraged state commissions to require local distribution companies to price the imported gas incrementally
at the retail level as well." See Op. No. 796, at 27.
41. DOE/ERA Op. No. 1, Pac Indonesia LNO Co., Docket No. 77-001-LNG (Dec. 30,
1977), decision on reh. penid.
42. Notice published at 42 Fed. Reg. 62419 (1977). Although public hearings were held
in early January, 1978. indications are that the LNG policy- review will not be concluded
until the latter half of 1978.
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A second major area of concern is that of the appropriate level
of U.S. dependence on imported gas supplies. Prior to formation of
the DOE, even though the FPC was vested with authority over imports, the Executive Branch remained concerned over the national
security and foreign policy aspects of LNG imports. Accordingly,
the Energy Resources Council,- after public comment, issued a
statement of policy on August 5, 1976, which concluded that LNG imports should be limited to no more than .8 to 1.0 TCF per year from
45
any one country and no more than 2 TCF per year in total. Subsequently, the ERC (acting through its "staff" in the Federal Energy
Administration) intervened in a number of FPC certification proceedings to present its recommendation.
As part of the LNG import policy review undertaken following
the election of President Carter, however, the ERC has withdrawn
its numerical recommendation. DOE has announced that the dependency question will be studied in the general LNG policy review now
underway.
LNG imports have encountered significant opposition at the state
and local level from environmental groups opposing the construction
of receiving terminals. Opponents argue that LNG is an "ultra-hazardous" substance and that ignition of an LNG spill could create an
explosion." While LNG is plainly a hazardous substance-as are
propane, naphtha, and other hydrocarbons handled daily at ports
around the country-the case for deeming LNG "ultra-hazardous" is
47
far from clear.
Nevertheless, opponents have succeeded in passing restrictive
siting laws in California48 and New York.4 9 The California law has
43.

See supra note 41,

at 35. Since the Pac Indonesia application involved sales directly

tjo two distribution companies (rather than interstate pipeline companies) the ERA was
able to reason that imIorts would be "incrementally priced" at the wholesale level regardless of ERA action.
44. The Energy Resources Council was created by § 108 of the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233-4, (1974). It was conceived' as a cabinet level
interdepartmental organization within the Executive Office of the President. The ERC
lacks Substantive authority, however, and is endowed with essentially an advisory role.
§ 162 of the Energy Conservation and Production Act, Pub. L. 94-385, 90 Stat. 1127, 1140
(1976) directs the ERC to prepare a yearly report on national energy conservation activities.
45. The ERC study also concluded that LNG imports should, where feasible, be incrementally priced to low priority users.
46. The legal consequences of classifying LNG activities as "ultra-hazardous" are extremely significant since operators of LNG facilities may be held) strictly liable for accidents regardless of the standard of care employed. The risk of strict liability may render
LNG projects virtually uninsurable thus extremely difficult, if not impossible, to finance.
47. See, e.g., Drake & Reid, The Importation of Liquefied Natural Gas, 236 ScIENTIFIC
AMERICAN 22 (1977), concluding that LNG is on a par with other common flammable
substances such as gasoline, propane, and vat'orous natural gas which have not been
regarded as "ultra-hazardous". For a detailed review of LNG history and operations see
W.
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48.

(1975).

The Liquefied Natural Gas Terminal Act of 1977, CAL. PUB.

(West Supp. 197S)

[hereinafter cited as the LNG Terminal Act].

UTIL. CODE i§ 5550-550
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apparently already forced a change in a previously approved site
from Oxnard, Califonia, to Point Conception, necessitating an amend-

ment to the original application and delaying final approval further. 50
Strong state and local opposition was also undoubtedly a factor in
ERA's imposition of a series of very restrictive conditions on the
Pac Indonesia import authorization, including a number of requirements with no relationship whatsoever to the alleged dangers of
LNG. 51
Federal siting legislation is another legislative obstacle likely to

be raised during the 1978 session of Congress. A number of bills were
introduced in 1977 containing a variety of approaches to siting LNG
terminals.5 2 Although no action was taken on the bills during 1977
because of congressional preoccupation with the proposed National
Energy Act, hearings were scheduled in March 1978 and increased
legislative interest is likely.
Regulatory delays in approving LNG import applications have
been very costly. On more than one occasion, the underlying gas
purchase contracts have been cancelled due to administrative delay.
When renegotiated, the price has invariably been higher and the
terms less advantageous to the U.S. importer and the ultimate con5 3
sumer.
49. Liquefied Natural and Petroleum Gas Act, ch. 892, 1976 N.Y. Laws. The constitutionality of the New York law is under attack in a suit pending in federal district court
for the Eastern District of New York.
50. The California example provides an Interesting lesson in how changes In one aspect of a transaction can have an irnact on others and trigger delay. After applicants
filed an amendment to propose a site that would likely conform to the California law,
an environmental group petitioned the ERC to reassert exclusive jurisdiction over the
proposal to the exclusion of the Energy Secretary. The petition reasoned that although
Import authority under § 3 of the Natural Gas Act had been transferred to the Energy
Secretary, the FERC retained jurisd'ction In the present case because the same terminal
would now be used for both imported LNG and domestic (Alaskan) LNG. Invoking the
commingling doctrine sanctioned in California v. Lo-Vaea Gathering Company, 379 U.S.
366 (1965), the petition therefore urgel, the FERC to assert its certification jurisdiction
under §1 4, 5, and 7 of the Natural Ga~s Act over the imported LNG as well. Although
the FERC has yet to rule on the petition, ERA's Op. No. 1, supra note 41, conditionally
approved the Initial site and noted that the issue of whether further federal proceedings
were necessary depended on action by the State of Californja under the LNG Terminal
Act. See ERA Op. No. 1, supra note 41, at 36-42.
51. For example, ordering paragraph 15 states, "Springs along the proposed or ultimate development pipeline routes which are known or suspected to be of value to wildlife
shall be avoided." ERA Op. No. 1, supra note 41, at 58 (emphasis added). Ordering paragraph 16 provides that!
Prior to beginning construction, qualified biologists should survey the proposed rights-of-way and access road routes to determine if any rare and
endangered animal species loca,ted along the prorosed or ultimate development routes would be adversely affected. Mitigating masures ...
shall be
considered.
Id. Such requirements could obviously be imposed any time any development activity of
any kind takes place in an undeveloped area.
52. See, e.g., S. 2273, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 6S44, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977).
53. In the Tr-nkline LNG proceedings, Initial arplications were filed in late 1973 and
hearings held in en-ly 1974. The base contract price was $.50 per million BTU, subject
to 4 percent annunl escalations. The hearings were recessed, however, rending completion of
an environmental impact statement. Sonatrach, the seller, exercised its contractual right
to terminate due to the delay. In 1975. a new contract was signed setting the minimum
base price of $1.30 per million RTE:. The new contract price was subject to adjustment
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As noted above, the division of responsibilities at the federal
level between the FPC and the Executive Branch concerning LNG
imports was ended by the Department of Energy Organization Act.
This institutional shift should allow for more rapid action on LNG
import applications by placing all federal regulation in a single agency. In addition, the Secretary is presumably not required to follow
the formal adjudicatory procedures of the FPC and the FERC. More
importantly, however, the DOE has the authority and the opportunity
to provide the stable policy framework which such massive projects
require. In this context, DOE's apparent decision in Pac Indonesia to
switch back to requiring incremental pricing is disappointing. While
in part the energy price increases have been due to the one-time
1973-1974 increase in world-wide crude oil prices, the fact remains
that for high priority, residential customers, the cost of LNG is well
below that of electricity. Accordingly, there is considerable upwards
pressure on price that is unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future.
In view of the large dollar investments required in LNG import
projects 54 and the emergence of international competition for LNG
supplies available for export," stable policy and expeditious governmental action are crucial. 56 It is doubtful that further study and review as proposed by DOE will yield many insights which earlier
studies by the FPC overlooked.
Nevertheless, if DOE proceeds expeditiously with its announced
review and establishes a regulatory framework conducive to LNG
import applications, the stage may be set for expanded gas supplies
for U.S. consumers. If not, yet another promising source of interstate gas supply may become tied up by federal regulatory restrictions.
2. Pipeline Imports From Mexico
Mexico is also a potential source of imported natural gas for the
tied to the price of imported fuel oil in New York Harbor, and was also subject to renegotiation every four years. Based on estimated yearly deliveries of 168 BCF, the increased cost of the new contract is thus a minimum of roughly $134 million per year.
Trunkline LNG Co., supra note 40.
Administrative delays combined with environmental opposition have troubled the
Easqogas LNG project as well and resulted in a virtually completed receiving terminal
on Staten Island, designed to receive LNG destined largely for New Jersey consumers,
remaining empty and unused during the 1976-77 winter gas supply emergency.
54. For example, the five recent liquefaction plants built at Kikda and Arzew, Algeria
are estimated to cost roughly $1.5 billion. OIL & GAS J. 60-61 (1977). The new generation of specially-designed cryogenic tankers used to carry LNG may cost upwards of a
hundred and fifty million dollars per ship.
55. When the Eascogas project to bring Algerian gas to the U.S. East Coast faltered
due to regulatory delays, Sonatrach was quickly able to resell a large portion of the re-

serves to Western European companies. The Japanese presently import significant quantities of LNG from East Asian sources and thus are real competitors for Indonesian and
Brunei supplies.

56.
REp.,
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future. On August 11, 1977, a group of six major interstate pipeline
companies filed an application with the FPC for authority to import
by pipeline up to two billion cubic feet of natural gas per day to be
purchased from Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), a Mexican stateaffiliated oil and gas company. The asking price, based on a formula
tied to the price of No. 2 fuel oil in New York harbor, was calculated
to be about $2.60 per MCF. Following the creation of the Deparfment
of Energy on October 1, 1977, the Section 3 import application was
transferred from the FPC to the office of the Secretary.
Despite the undisputed need for the new supplies, the Energy Secretary took the position that the $2.60 price was too high. While negotiations as to price were pending, Senator Adlai Stevenson (D-Ill.) on
October 19, 1977, introduced Concurrent Resolution 59 expressing the
sense of the Senate that the $2.60 price was "unreasonable" and urging the Export-Import Bank to refuse to assist in financing the project unless the gas was to be 'sold at a "fair and reasonable" price.
As explained by Senator Stevenson: "In my judgment, this price i's
unreasonable. It is higher than present prices for imported natural
gas and unregulated domestic gas. I do not believe Eximbank should
go ahead with its financing until we are assured of a reasonable price
'57
for U.S. imports of gas from the project.
Secretary Schlesinger stood firm on the price issue 8 and on
December 22, 1977, PEMEX suspended its sales offer and announced
it would not renew the tentative agreeent when it expired on December 31, 1977, and the parties have remained at a stand-off.
While there is undoubtedly a good deal of bargaining involved on
both sides, 59 and agreement may later be reached on the price term,
the importance of additional supplies of more than 700 BCF per
year-more than 5 percent of currently flowing interstate supplies
-should not be underestimated.
D. SYNTHETIC NATURAL GAS (SNG)
FEEDSTOCKS

FROM LIQUID HYDROCARBON

Another gas supply option available to gas companies is the manufacture of synthetic natural gas (SNG). SNG plants convert a variety of liquid hydrocarbon feestocks (such as naphtha, propane, bu57. Congressional Record, S. Con. Res. 59, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 95 CONG. REC. 17371
(1977). The Resolution was referred to committee and as of the end of 1977, no action

had been taken.
5S. DOE Staff had recommended that the price should be no higher than $2.16 per MCF,
the price for Canadian pipeline imports.
59. Both sides have a strong bargaining position. M'exican gas represents an easily
available new source of supply which the gas hungry U.S. markets could easily use. On
the other hand, since it would be transported by conventional pipelines, the U.S. seems
to be virtually the only market for gas which might otherwise be flared. However, an
agreement to pay $2.60 for Mexican. imports might trigger Canadian demands for comparable prices. Sooner or later an agreement will likely be reached.
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tane, and natural gas liquids) into pipeline quality synthetic gas.
Utilizing commercially proven technology, SNG facilities are particularly advantageous in view of the short lead times-some two to
three years-needed to move from planning to online operation.
The final cost of the synthetic product is much more heavily dependent on feedstock costs than on capital or operating costs. 6° The
quintupling of crude oil prices since 1973 has thus adversely affected
the economics of SNG manufacture, pushing the price of a thousand
cubic feet of SNG from around $1.50 in 1973 to some $3.50 to $4.50 or
more today.
Under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C.
§ 751 et seq. (Supp. III 1973), the Federal Energy Administration
(FEA) 1 was charged with the responsibility for allocating refined
petroleum products, including those products used as SNG feedstocks.
In the competition for feedstock allocations, SNG use of naptha has
consistently been given a lower priority than other users, particularly
the petrochemical industry.
On July 31, 1974, the FEA, following a period of notice and public
comment, added Special Rule No. 1 to Subpart A of the Mandatory
Petroleum Allocation Regulations, 10 C.F.R. Part 211. The FEA's
Statement of Policy accompanying the new regulation condemned
SNG manufacture as a "thermally inefficient" use of energy resources and promulgated new SNG feedstock allocation regulations
based on a policy which "in general discourages allocation of scarce
petroleum resources to manufacturers of SNG. ' ' 62 Indeed, the agency
explicitly recognized that its regulations, although allowing existing
plants to continue to receive allocations for present production capacity, would effectively preclude the construction of new plants. "The
FEA recognizes that ... the statement of policy and the special rule
issued today will operate to eliminate SNG manufacture from liquid
hydrocarbon feedstocks as a supplemental supply alternative for the
majority of [gas transmission and distribution] companies." 6 3
FEA suggested that the gas industry pursue other alternatives such
as coal gasification and increased domestic exploration and resource
64
development.
FEA's assessment of the restrictive impact of its new policy has
been borne out. Since the policy was implemented in August of 1974,
60. In some cases the cost of naphtha feedstock accounts for as much as eighty percent
of the finished product cost.
61. Actually, the FEA did not come into existence until the Federal Energy Administration Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-86 (Supp. 1975), was passed by Congress in 1974. At the time
the EPAA was enacted, product ajlocations became the responsibility of the Federal
Energy Office (FEO), an office within the executive office of the President. Under the
Department of Energy Organization Act, the authority and responsibilities of the FEA
wede transferred to the Energy Secretary. See DOE Act, supra note 14, § 301 (a).
62. 39 Fed. Reg. 27910, 27911 (1974).
63. Id. at 27912.
64. Id.
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not a single new plant has been constructed and a number of planned
projects have been deferred indefinitely or cancelled, largely as a
result of the inability to obtain access to a feedstock supply.
On July 20, 1976, FEA declared that naphtha was no longer in
short supply, and amended its allocation regulations to decontrol all
uses of naphtha except for use in SNG manufacture.65 The restrictive policy was retained on the grounds that an environmental impact
statement was required before naphtha could be decontrolled for
SNG use. 66
The Carter Administration recognized that FEA's restrictive SNG
feedstock allocation policy was not consistent with the nation's energy
needs and took initial steps to loosen the restrictions. The National
Energy Plan published in April 1977 declared:
The Nation's current policy toward synthetic natural gas
(SNG) made from petroleum feedstocks is not satisfactory.
Existing regulations favor the allocation of naphtha and other
potential SNG feedstocks to the petrochemical industry, and
effectively preclude their use by gas utilities. This policy has
discouraged the construction of new SNG plants. Yet, the 13
SNG plants that were operating last winter provided the additional margin of natural gas supply that kept several areas
of the country 6from
shutting off residential users during the
7
coldest months.
Subsequently; FEA published its Final Environmental Impact
Statement with respect to the use of petroleum feedstocks for SNG
manufacture and conceded that its earlier finding that SNG was an
inefficient use of resources had been wrong.
The range of efficiencies of SNG for certain end uses has
been found to be comparable to that of other fuels for the
same uses. Despite the limitation of these determinations, in
a reversal from the 1974 Statement of Policy, FEA does not
find at this time that SNG produced from light petroleum products is significantly more inefficient for such end uses than
alternatives compared.68
Despite the findings that (1) naphtha was no longer in short supply; (2) SNG use of naphtha is not inefficient compared to compar65. See 41 Fed. Reg. 3PONd;, 30097 (1976) specifically finffing that "[nlaphthas . . . are
not now in short supply."
66. FEA did not ex-lain why an imna t statement was not considered necessary prior
to opening up access to .ir, htha on the part of all other users.
67. National Energy Plan, at 57 [hereinafter cited as NEP].
68. 42 Fed. Reg. 44554 (1977). The actual EIS findings on this point were far more
favorable to SNG than implied by FEA in the notice. Exhibit 8.3-4 reprinted below as
Table I Indicated that for residential snace heating and commercial water heating, the
overall efficiency of SNG was higher than for anN" other non-gaseous fuel. SNG even

ranked as a more efficdent use of resources than Alaskan gas.
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able alternative energy sources; and (3) SNG plants provide a crucial component of gas supply over the short term; FEA nonetheless
retained controls on the use of naphtha for SNG manufacture, requiring all proposed plants to obtain an allocation assignment. 69 And
while the revised regulations state that the 1974 Statement of Policy
discouraging the construction of new plants no longer accurately reflects FEA policy,7 ° they continue to impose numerous restrictions
which were not applied to any other present or potential naphtha
user. Included are requirements that certain feedstocks be imported,
and that operators maintain a 30-day peak load supply of all feedstock in "readily accessible" storage. In addition, the volumes of
feedstock allocated to the plant must be calculated so that, when
added to all other projected sources of natural gas supplies, SNG
production will just allow the plant owner to meet specified high priority gas uses under design winter conditions. The new regulations
also require applicants for an allocation to submit information as to
a "laundry list" of factors which FEA (now DOE) apparently will
continue to take into account in determining whether or not to grant
1
a feedstock alIocation.7
Finally, the new regulations have put all potential SNG plant operators on notice that even if an allocation were granted, DOE will,
in its discretion, review manufacturing operations under the scope of
the allocation and may unilaterally adjust or rescind the allocation,
69..
70.
71.

42 Fed. Reg. 54403 (1977).
See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 44551' (1977).
(d)
New Applivations. Any application for adjustment or assignment shall
contain, in addition to the information specified in §§ 205.24 or 205.34 of
Part 205 of this chapter, the following information:
(1)
The applicant's projected pipeline supply of natural gas for the period
for which the allocation is sought.
(2)
All other current and projected sources of gas supplies, including, but
not limited to, underground storage, liquefied natural gas (LNG), propane
air, SNG from coal, and the efforts the applicant has made to obtain such
supplies.
(3)
The projected demand for gas (design winter and other estimatedby voume and number of customers) in the applicant's market area, by consuming sector (set forth by FPC priority or other readily identifiable categories with separate identification of industrial boiler fuel requirements),
including estimates of that portion of the demand for which the SNG will
be required.
(4)
The projected rate of growth of gas consumption In the applicant's market area for each consuming sector.
(5)
The projected schedule of curtailments of pipeline supplies of gas for
the allocation period, and a description of any curtailment plan in effect
for the market area to be served by the SNG plant and an estimate of the
effect of such plan.
(6)
A description of the rate structures of the SNG manufacturer including
pricing policies for SNG and other supplemental sources of gas.
(7)
A complete description of the proposed feedstock, including the supplier(s), volumes, prices, and technical specifications of the feedstock.
(8)
The design and practical feedstock capacity of the SNG plant.
(9)
The proposed product needed for BTU-enrichment requirements of the
SNG plant, including source, volumes, and price.
(10)
The proposed SNG plant fuel, including source and volumes.
(11)
Other information which may be identified by FEA as necessary for
a comprehensive evaluation of the application.
42 Fed. Reg. 54403, 54407 (1977).
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hardly an encouraging prospect for someone contemplating the large
72
investment involved in SNG plant construction.
The DOE has now assumed FEA's authority over feedstock allocations pursuant to Section 301 (a) of the DOE Act. Allocation
descisions previously made by FEA have been delegated by the EnTABLE I
Exhibit No. 8.3-4
COMPARISON OF OVERALL ENERGY
EFFICIENCIES FOR SELECTED TOTAL TRAJECTORIES

TRAJECTORY

OVERALL EFFICIENCY
(Percent)

RESIDENTIAL SPACE HEATING
62-70
Imported LPG
59-67
Imported LNG
56-64
Offshore Natural Gas
55-63
SNG from LPG
55-63
SNG from Naphtha
52-59
Alaskan Gas (Arctic Gas Pipeline)
51-58
Distillate Fuel Oil
35
Coal
27.5
Residual Fuel Oil-Produced Electricity
24.0
Coal-Produced Electricity
18.5
Nuclear Power-Produced Electricity
COMMERCIAL WATER HEATING
57
Imported LNG
54.6
Offshore Natural Gas
53
SNG from Naphtha
53
SNG from LPG
50
Alaskan Gas (Arctic Gas Pipeline)
45
Coal
44
Distillate Fuel Oil
27.4
Distillate Fuel Oil-Produced Electricity
23.1
Coal-Produced Electricity
18.0
Nu.lear PoweT-Produced Electricity
PROCESS STEAM PRODUCTION FOR INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
59
Distillate Fuel Oil
57
ImrTorted LNG
54.5
Wffs'iore Natural Gas
53
SNG from Nanhtha
53
SNG from LPG
50
Alaskan Gas (Arctic Gas Pipeline)
45
Coal
SOURCE: Exhibit 8.3-4, Final Programmtic Environmental Impact Statement on
the Allocations of Petroleum Feedstocks To Synthetic Natural Gas
8 3
Plants (August 1977) at p. . -5.
72.

Review. Each firm operating an SNG plant shall be subject to review
(g)
at the discretion of FEA to assure that the firm is continuing to operate
the plant in accordance with the factual basis for and the terms and condiions of the allocation order and the applicable regulations. On the basis
of such a review the FEA may determine that adjustment or rescission of
the allocation is app'opriate. Any such rescission or adjustment to an allocation order shall be upon reasonable notice given to all interested parties,
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73
ergy Secretary to the Administrator of ERA. While the new regulations appear to contain significant changes in former policy, it
is still too early to tell whether they will be applied in such a way
as to encourage or effectively discourage expansions of SNG manufacturing capacity.

III. EVALUATION OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES CONCERNING GAS SUPPLIES

A.

ADMINISTRATIVE

IMPLEMENTATION

As indicated by the preceeding survey, the Carter Administration
has brought little change to gas issues in 1977 and early 1978. What
change there has been, has tended to further discourage development of available options for expanding gaseous fuel supplies.
Although the FERC is primarily an adjudicatory commission intended to be independent from the Executive Branch in deciding litigated cases before it, its members are presidential appointees and
wield considerable policy-making authority. Nevertheless, FERC has
in essence carried forward the prior policies of the FPC respecting
supplemental supplies for growth. With respect to the "finders-keepers" policy for supplemental supplies developed by distribution companies, the NOMECO decision, supra, announced that a comparative
needs test would be used in the future; only if the distributor needed
the supplemental supplies more than other potential purchasers
would Commission approval be forthcoming. And, the distributor
would have the burden of demonstrating its greater need as part of
4
the application.7
As detailed above, FERC has reaffirmed the FPC's policy of approving expansions of storage capacity only if the purpose of the new
capacity is to serve existing load and not to add new customers.
FERC's use of curtailment cases to implement a policy toward
new supplies and load growth remains ambiguous. And although the
"saver's keepers" principle was explicitly adopted in the Cities Service proceeing, Congressional prodding was also involved.
The impact of the change in administrations might be expected
to be felt more strongly on the issues of natural gas imports and
with an opportunity for a hearing provided to the operator of the affected
SNG plant.
Id.
(emphasis added). As with the decision to reserve the right to issue supplemental
orders in the Pac Indonesia LNG import case, the DOE's insistence on the neej2 to "retain flexibility" introduces a significant new source of uncertainty and thereby increases
the risks (and the costs) involved in planning, financing, and constructing new SNO
manufacturing facilities. Whether existing policy will continue to discourage expansions
in SNG capacity remains to be seen. At present, however, the odds are that DOE's policies toward SNG feedstock allocations will surely prevent SNG from playing as signficant a role as might have been the case had SNG manufacture been treated on a par
with other userS.
1).
(DOE Delegation Order No. 0204-4,
73. 42 Fed. neg. 60726 (1977)

74.

NOMECO, supra note 6, at 8.
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SNG manufacture since decision-making as to the role of these supply sources is now directly within the DOE, a cabinent-level department. Initial action by DOE in these areas, however, has tended to
impose greater restrictions on expansions of these supply alterna.
tives than in the past.
Although DOE is still in the process of formally developing a
comprehensive policy on LNG imports, its apparent adoption of incremental pricing in the Pac Indonesia proceedings, if applied to
other projects, will undoubtedly act as a damper on new supplies.
Similarly, the imposition of more stringent environmental conditions
unrelated to safety concerns, and the express reservation of the authority to review the project and issue supplemental orders, will not
encourage expanded LNG imports. Indeed, although the National Energy plan emphasized that the prior import recommendations of Energy Resources Council would be replaced by a "more flexible policy
that sets no upper limit on LNG imports," the NEP then estimated
that LNG imports may provide as much as .5 to 1.0 TCF of new
supplies-less than half of the total amounts that would have been
allowed under the prior guidelines under the Ford Administration. 7
The inability of DOE to reach agreement with the Mexican government on a price for pipeline imports is further indication that the
Carter Administration prefers a policy of allocating gas shortages by
regulation rather than encouraging new supplies and allowing allocation by the price mechanism.
The NEP criticized the FEA's prior policy of discouraging the
development of SNG manufacturing facilities through denial of feedstock allocations and announced that a federal task force would work
with the gas industry to "identify those areas of the country where
a limited number of additional SNG plants should be built to help
meet the critical peak load needs for gas over the next 5 to 7
years." 76 Yet as of early 1978, there had been no decision by DOE
of areas where new plants should be constructed. And while the
petroleum feedstock allocation regulations restricting access by
SNG manufacturers were indeed revised in September of 1977, the
new regulations imposed a number of restrictive conditions not contained in the prior regulations, including provisions for review of operations "at the discretion" of DOE and possible rescission of the
77
feedstock allocation.
On balance then, the Carter Administration's policy towards supplemental gas supplies and load growth, as actually implemented
75.

NEP, supra note 67, at 57.

76. Id. at 58. The NEP foresaw production of close to one trillion cubic feet of SNO
a year in the 1980's. Id. This would represent an increase of some 500 percent from the
201 BCF of SNG manufactured during 1975.
77. Id. at 29.
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during 1977, tended to discourage the development of new sources
of gaseous fuels. That policy is even more pronounced in the proposed National Energy Act (NEA). The NEA, through a series of
penalties and some incentives, would operate to force electrical utilities and industries to convert from gaseous fuels to nuclear power
and coal. The rationale for this policy is the stated belief that natural
gas production from traditional sources will continue to decline in
the future and that residential and commercial markets can only be
protected by forcing other gas users to burn non-gaseous fuels. The
NEP states explicitly that:
In the short term, the new sources of natural gas [Alaskan
gas, OCS, "tight" formations, geopressurized zones, SNG,
and imported LNG] will not be able to reverse the downward trend in total U.S. production. Supplies for the residential and commercial sector will 78have to be obtained by
diverting gas from electric utilities.
The variety of federal policies discouraging supplemental gas
supplies and distributor load growth, developed on an ad hoc basis
throughout the 1970's, have thus been embraced by the Carter Administration, and will apparently be integrated into a comprehensive
policy which has as a stated consequence a rapidly declining role
for gaseous fuels in the national energy picture. Whether such a policy is justified in terms of overall policy objectives is the topic to
which we now turn.
B.

THE UNDERLYING AssuMPTIONS

The Carter Administration's policies limiting the development of
supplemental gas supplies apparently attempt to achieve two basic
goals. First, they seek to protect existing residential and commercial gas users from both shortages and higher prices. Second, and as
a primary means to the goal of protecting those preferred customers, the Administration's proposals seek to husband known gas resources by effectively forcing other gas users to shift to alternate
fuels.
Whether the Carter Administration's proposals will attain these
goals in turn rests on the validity of two assumptions that are crucial to the program's success but rarely analyzed or discussed. The
policies assume first of all that natural gas is essentially an irreplaceable physical resource in fixed supply, and which is being
rapidly depleted. For example, the Energy Policy and Planning Office of the President has estimated that even with the higher well78. Id. at P).
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head price allowed under the President'!s proposals, domestic natural
gas production would decline from 1976 production levels of 19.9 TCF
to 16.9 TCF in 1978 and 16.6 TCF by 1980, before rising slightly to
about 17.0 TCF by 1985. 79 If the Administration is correct in assuming that natural gas is a fixed and depleting resource for which there
are no readily available substitutes, it follows that existing high priority customers should have first call on production, as provided for
by the Administration's National Energy Act.
Implicit in the assumption that natural gas is essentially irreplaceable is the second key assumption of the Carter Administration
policies: the expansion of electric generating capacity is preferable
to the development of supplemental gas supplies. This implicit electric "bias" is seen most clearly in the fuel balances projected by the
NEP. In residential and commercial markets, natural gas use is
projected to increase only 5 percent from 1976 to 1985; use of electricity in these market sectors is expected to jump more than 33 percent 0° In industrial applications, the Plan provides for minimal growth
of two percent in gas use by 1985, while industrial use of electricity
is expected to shoot up nearly 70 percent, 8 ' nearly thirty-five times
as much. The fuels for this expanded electric generating capacity
will be coal (projected to increase about 70 percent) and nuclear (to
increase 280 percent) .82 In 1985 the NEP projects that coal will be
the nation's premier fuel, as shown by Table II below.
TABLE II
Market Share Of U.S. Domestic
Energy Supplies In 1985 Under NEP8 3
Fuel
Coal
Crude Oil
Natural Gas
Nuclear
Other
Refinery Gain

Percentage of Supply
36%
27%
22%
10%
4%
2%

The policy preference for electricity thus assumes in large part that
the nation's abundant coal resources are best used in boiler fuel in
coal-fired industrial facilities and for central station electricity gen79. EXFCUTTVE OFFICE OF THE PRSTIDFNT.
ENFRGY POLICY AND PLANNING STAFF, NATIONAL
ENERGY PLAN: ("'I AND GAS SUPPLY 76 (1977). Without the plan, production Is projected
to drcline from 16.9 TCF in 1978 to 15.9 TCF by 1985. Id. See also NEP, supra note 67,

at 19.
80. Id. at 95.
81. Id.
82. Id. The magnitude of the percentage Increase in nuclear power Is
the relatively low base of existing nuclea" generating capacity.
83. Id. at 96 (figure IX-l) (totals may not add due to rounding).

due In

part to
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erat.on. Similarly, the various incentives and penalties aimed at shift.
ing industrial users of natural gas to direct applications of coal presupposes that this use of coal is preferable for industrial applications
to alternative sources of gaseous fuels.

C. AN ASSESSMENT
These underlying assumptions are open to serious question. Indeed, in a number of instances they appear only weakly supported
by the available evidence.
1. The "Irreversible" Decline In Natural Gas Production
From Traditional Sources
"[N]either Government policy nor market incentives can improve on nature and create additional oil or gas in the ground."8 4
While there are obviously physical parameters limiting natural gas
reserves, the Administration appears to ignore the important economic parameters defining the resource base at any given time. Thus,
in many instances the unit cost of producing a gas reservoir may be
above prevailing price levels merely because the volume of reserves
discovered by a given well is small in relation to the costs of drilling
and production. In other words, in a very real sense, government policy and market incentives can and do "create" additional gas reserves by altering the boundaries of economic production.
The Carter Administration policies, however, appear to focus
only on gas reserves producible at generally prevailing price levels
in concluding that conventional production will fall to 16.9 TCF in
1978. In fact, however, natural gas production appears to be responding to the sharply increased price levels of recent years. Production
apparently began to turn up during the fourth quarter of 1976, several months after the FPC tripled the ceiling price for new interstate
5
sales in Opinion No. 770, supra.8
More recently, DOE has estimated
that marketed production through October of 1977 remained approximately .3 percent above the comparable 1976 levels.8 6 If this trend
continues-and in light of continuing record high levels of domestic
drilling activity, this seems a reasonable assumption-production for
1977 would be roughly 20.0 TCF. The Administration's estimate of
16.9 TCF of conventional production in 1978 appears very seriously
understated in light of these figures. Indeed if existing price levels
84.

Id. at xi.

85.
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reach the Administration's 16.9 TCF estimate, production would have to plummet some
3.1 TCF or more than 15 percent in a single year. In contrast, the steepest yearly decline, experienced from 1974 to 1975, was approximately 1.5 TCF or under half as much.
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are adequate to call out this level of supply in the prevailing climate
of uncertainty as to future legislation affecting price and production,
policies based on the assumption of a continuing rapid decline in production merit serious reconsideration.*87
2. The "Irreplaceability" Of Natural Gas Supplies
Nor should conventional sources of gas supply alone be considered
in assuming that the existing stock of natural gas is "irreplaceable".
Over the short term, expanded storage and conservation may make
more gas available to high priority users. Similarly, SNG facilities
can be constructed and placed on line within two to three years to
bridge the gap to when other supplies become available. Natural gas
produced from such unconventional formations as Devonian shales
may also make a significant contribution."" Other supply sources
which are commercially feasible today, include imported LNG, pipeline imports from Mexico, and coal gasification.
The NEP states that "[tjhe opportunities for supplementing
domestic production of natural gas with imports are small."8 9
As detailed above, if this is indeed the case, it is primarily because
DOE (and the FPC before it) tended to discourage imports through
regulatory delay, ishifts in policy, and perhaps most importantly,
through unwillingness to allow imports at prices in excess of current
U.S. levels. 90 Understandably, it would be a difficult task to justify
paying, for example, $2.60 per MCF for Mexican production while
denying American producers a similar price. But the dilemma merely
underlines the fact that, over the near term at least, the current gas
shortages are fundamentally shortages of gas at politically acceptable
price levels rather than shortages of physical resources themselves.
A variety of processes exist for manufacturing substitutes for
87. The validity of the Carter Administration's assumption as to the size of the conventional resource base has also been drawn into question by the controversy surrounding
initially developed by ERDA
the Market Oriented Program Planning Study (MOPPS)
in March and April, 1977. According to the initial draft, which was subsequently withdrawn, at well head prices of around $3.00 per MCF, production from a variety of high
cost production areas would become attractive, expending the existing base of known reserves by tremend'ous amounts. See Hearings on Market-Oriented Program Planning Study
before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
The Study has been subjected to extensive review and a revised version is ex(1978).
pected in the first half of 1978.
88. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSIENT, GAS POTENTIAL FROM DEVONIAN SHALES OF
THE APPALACHIAN BASIS (1977).

89. NEP, supra note 67, at 16.
90. There are unquestionably substantial additional supplies of natural gas on the
world market today. Unfortunately, the marginal price of additonal petroleum-a close
substitute in many cases-is, of course, controlled by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As long as that price level for marginal energy supply is
maintained, all other supplies of energy on the world market will tend to be priced at
comparable levels. While DOE may believe that it is unfair for American consumers to
pay a monopoly price for imports, the sad fact remains that the OPEC-imposed price i.
the price for hydrocarbon supplies at the margin. Unless and until that fact is changed,
the prices of competing fuels will all tend to move towards the margin.
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natural gas. SNG from liquid hydrocarbons is one such option which
is available for the short term. But pipeline quality gas can also be
made from coal, the nation's most abundant fossil resource. A number of recent studies estimate that a full scale coal gasification facility could produce high BTU gas at a cost of approximately $4.30
per million BTU91 delivered to the user. While this iis substantially
above the current price for natural gas, it is significantly less expensive than a comparable quantity of electrical energy produced from
coal.
Indeed, a memorandum to the Energy Secretary from DOE's
Office of Policy and Planning states
If the NEP and production incentives are not fully successful
in making gas supplies available to priority users, HBG [highBTU coal gas] delivered in the home at about $5.00 per million BTU's is preferable to electricity costing about $10 per
million BTUs [sic] for priority use such as space heating. 2
The memorandum concludes that
without favorable federal action, no HBG project is likely to
proceed. The ability to sell HBG at production cost is a prerequisite for any HBG project. This requires favorable FERC
treatment allowing a full cost of production gas price and
rolled-in pricing. . . . Loan guarantees and/or "all events"
tariffs would encourage several projects which are presently
proposed.9 3
Substitute gaseous fuels can also be made from a variety of renewable resources. Methane can, for example, be manufactured from
horse or cow manure, from plant material grown and harvested specially for gas manufacture, or even from municipal garbage.9 4 These
biomass processes (producing a substitute gaseous fuel frequently
termed "biogas") are in an earlier stage of development than coal
gas and the economics of commercial facilities are not yet well de9 5
fined.
Nevertheless, the assumption that existing natural gas reserves
are an irreplaceable resource which must be carefully husbanded for
existing residential and commercial users appears ill-supported. In91. Production costs themselves would be 'on the order of $3.70 per million BTU's with
transmission and local distribution costs making up the remainder. See Prospects for Coal
Gasification Information Memorandum at 1 (internal DOE memorandum to the Secretary
dated November 16, 1977).
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id. at 27.
94. See, e.g., W,ise, Biomass: Progress and Plans in ENERGY TECHNOLOGY IV: CONFRONTING REALITY, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH ENERGY TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON. D.C. 434-54 (1977) ; JACKSON, ENERGY FROM SOLID WASTE 106-24 (Noyes Data Corp.
1974).
95. See, e.g., Wise, sulpra note 94, at 445-46.
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deed, it is far too often forgotten that the gas distribution industry
has depended on manufactured gas supplies for most of its century
and a half existence. 96 It was only in the 1940's and early 1950's that
natural gas production from Texas, Louisiana, and other Southwest
areas was finally brought to the industrial Northeast. The most important advantage of natural gas over manufactured gas at the time
was natural gas' lower costY7 As the economics of gas production
have changed over time, the cost advantage of natural gas has been
eroded.
3. Existing Residential And Commercial Users Will Be Protected By Forcing Other Markets To Shift To Coal Or Nuiclear Fuels
This assumption follows from the belief that gas supplies are a
fixed, depleting resource. But even if it is conceded that supplemental
gas supplies may be readily developed as traditional natural gas reserves decline, it may be argued that existing residential and commercial customers should be protected from the higher costs of new
supplies by reallocating to these preferred customers the low-cost,
existing supplies, while forcing other customers to absorb the cost
of higher-priced substitutes. This is, of course, precisely an object of
the Carter Administration proposals. 9
This approach, however, ignores the high costs associated with
under-utilized pipeline capacity and in fact would unduly increase the
cost to consumers as compared to a policy of developing additional
supplies for new as well as existing customers.
The transmission and local distribution of natural gas are highly
capital-intensive activities. A large portion of costs of gas at the
burner tip are related to the fixed costs associated with constructing,
operating, and maintaining the enormous investment in pipelines,
compressor stations, and the like. 99 As a result, the unit cost of delivered gas tends to be sensitive to throughput, that is to say, the
number of units over which the fixed capital-related costs are spread.
96. The manufactured gas of this period had a substantially lower BTU content than
natural gas. With the shift to natural gas over the past decades, the stock of gas-fueled
equipment and appliances has been replaced with equipment which cannot easily make
use of low BTU gas. Accordingly, the older technology for manufacturing gas cannot
be used to produce pipeline quality gas sought today. Low BTU gas could be used in
many industrial applications, however.
97. The low cost of natural gas init'ally was due in significant part to the fact that
natural gas was largely a by-product of oil production. Until markets developed, it was
often treated as an undesirable by-product for which the producer was happy to get even
a low price. A.
more and more natural gas was discovered as a result of exploration
specifically for gas, the 1'y-product quality of natural gas disappeared. In addition, more
refined exploration tecnio,es
in use today frequently allow exploration for natural gas
reservoirs not associated with petroleum.
98. See NEP, snora note 67, at 94.
99. See 1 FED. POWER COMM'N, NATIONAL GAS SURVEY 60 (1975).
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This need to make full use of capacity puts a premium on maintaining operations at a high load factor. 10 0
The importance of this aspect of gas industry operations is magnified by the fact that residential and commercial gas sales consist
largely of space heating requirements that vary sharply with corresponding swings in temperature. Utilities are under a legal duty
to provide adequate ,service within their market area. Because the
company must have adequate capacity to service its customers' peakday temperature sensitive needs, substantial capacity will be unused
during the remainder of the year. Unless the unused transportation
capacity can somehow be filled during the offpeak season, existing
customers that benefit from the capacity needed to serve their peakday demands must pay for the excess "valley" capacity. To the extent capacity remains unused in off-peak seasons, the unit cost of the
gas actually delivered will be higher than necessary.
The various operating and marketing practices designed to make
use of this unused capacity are known as "load balancing techniques",
and are an important part of gas company operations and planning. 10 1
Some of the more common practices include interruptible sales during off-peak seasons; storage (both as liquefied natural gas or "LNG"
above-ground, and in suitable geological formations underground);
year-round industrial sales which show little seasonable variation;
and propane-air peaking facilities.
The combination of high capital costs and temperature-sensitive
sales means that in many cases it may be cheaper for distribution
company and consumer alike to purchase supplemental supplies of
gas at a price in excess of flowing gas rates in order to increase the
total units of gas over which the fixed costs are spread: filling the
"empty pipe" with expensive supplemental supplies may reduce fixed
costs per unit of throughput significantly. Put another way, there is a
significant "surcharge" imposed by underutilization of pipeline ca10 2
pacity.
Preventing a gas distributor from attaching new customers thus
imposes significant cost on utility and consumer alike. As public utilities subject to extensive regulation of rates and service by state public
utility commissions, distribution companies are given the opportunity
to earn a rate of return prescribed by the appropriate regulatory
100.

One definition of a company's

load factor is the percentage

ratio of average de-

liveries to full capaCity. Thus, a distribution company with enough unused capacity to
double its present throughput would be operating at roughly a 50 percent load factor.
101. Load balancing is of particular concern to gas distribution, companies. While longdistance transmission lines can usually operate with a load factor in the 70 to 95 percent
range, distribution companies, engaged in the business of ultimately making gas service
available to temperature sensitive residential and commercial users, usually operate in the

35 to 50 percent range.
102. See BUREAU OF NATURAL GAS, THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS: EcoNoMIlc MYTHS,
REGULATORY REALITIES (1976). The report estimates that the surcharge may rise to some
roughly 83 cents per MCF by the year 2000 for residential consumers
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body. The utility is not, however, assured of earning the approved
rate of return. If, for example, the company is unable to attach new
customers to replace customers lost over time, earnings will fall. In
addition, a decline in sales tends to increase the distributor's unit
costs, thereby threatening its competitive position vis-a-vis suppliers
of other sources of energy. Indeed, in light of the rapidly increasing
costs of merely maintaining the existing system of distribution lines, 10 3
unit costs will increase even if sales only remain constant. Attrition
of earnings imposes a further cost on the company when seeking financing as higher interest rates and increased coverage requirements
may be imposed by the lender to compensate for the utility's less
favorable earnings position.
A no-growth posture, if imposed indefinitely, could lead to a vicious circle where increasing unit costs induce some customers (primarily industrial and larger commercial users) to convert to alternate fuels, thereby decreasing distributor sales further and increasing
the unit cost of serving the remaining customers. The increased costs
in turn encourage more customers to convert to alternate fuels, thereby repeating the process. Further, since industrial sales tend to be far
less sensitive to temperature changes than do residential and commercial loads, erosion of industrial markets requires a distributor to
adopt alternate (and far more expensive) load balancing strategies.
The party that stands to lose most from an enforced policy of
zero or negative growth is the residential and small commercial customer theoretically sought to be protected. This portion of the market
has the least freedom to shift to alternative fuels due to the sharply
higher relative costs of conversion. 10 4
As costs escalate, the remaining customers must absorb ever increasing unit costs. Hence, as the utility's industrial and large commercial markets erode due to growth restrictions and the gas company's worsening competitive position, the increasing burden will tend
to be imposed more and more on the remaining customers, which are
increasingly the politically sensitive residential consumers.
Although it is difficult to quantify the extra costs associated with
underutilized capacity, one study has estimated that in 1975 residential and commercial users paid over $1.1 billion more for the same
volumes of gas than if pipelines had been operating at full capacity. 10 5
103. For example, according to the Handy Whitman Index of construction costs, the
cost of installing gas mains increased nearly eighty percent from 1969 to 1976. This means
that the cost of necessary replacement of old pipe is far higher than the original installation cost. If sales remain the same, unit costs will increase accordingly.
104. See Jensen & Stauffer, Implications of Natural Gas Conslemption Patterns for the
Implementation of End-Use Priority Plans: Report To The Office of General',Counel,
General
105.

Motors
Crioration
in ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC. STUDY.
H.
ZINDER & ASSOCIATES,
INC.
FACTORS CRITICAL TO WELLHEAD PRICES FOR NEW
NATURAL GAS SUPPLIES. INCLUDINo THE CONSUMER BENEFITS OF SUPPLY ELICITING PRICES
OVER THE INCREASING TOTAL COSTS OF CURTAILMENTS To THE CONSUMER (1975)
(State-

ment 2). See also BUREAU OF -NATURAL GAS, supra note 102.
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There are several alternatives to increasing residential and small
commercial customers' rates to cover the increased costs of service.
First, through its ratemaking powers, the state utility commission
may force the utility's stockholders to bear at least a portion of these
increased costs rather than allowing them to be passed along to consumers. 10 Alternatively, the state commission might order some type
of "life-line" rate to be extended to certain small users, thereby requiring other users to subsidize those favored customers. 10 7
Realistically, it is unlikely that the full brunt of cost increases
will be imposed equally on all remaining customers. Political pressures to protect the small consumer may well result in some combination of forcing either the utility or the remaining large customers
to shoulder a disproportionate share of the higher unit costs. Of
course, if the situation went so far as to push the utility toward bankruptcy, subsidies of tax monies would be required to maintain "essential" services to the dwindling group of remaining customers.
The Carter Administration energy proposals would allocate new
supplies of gas increasingly to residential and commercial users while
allocating higher costs initially to industrial users. The "vicious circle" of increasing unit costs discussed above, however, will make that
option counterproductive in the long run.
4. Expansion Of Electrical GeneratingCapacity Is A Preferred
Alternative For Increasing Domestic Energy Production
This assumption of the Carter Administration policies is the basis
for the variety of incentives and penalties designed to spur the development of coal and nuclear generating facilities. Similarly, it is
primarily responsible for the NEP',s projection of a nearly 50 percent
jump in demand for electricity between 1976 and 1985.108 The assumption that electricity is the best domestic alternative should be
examined from the perspectives of economics, resource efficiency,
environmental degradation, and social impact.
Economics. As with other fuels, the economics of electricity vary
widely depending on several factors, including the market sector
served. 0 9 While electricity may be less expensive than gas (on a BTU
basis) for some industrial applications, many industrial uses involve
106. For example, the Ohio Public Utility Commission has argued before the FERC that
the shareholders of Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation should bear the costs of highpriced emergency gas purchased to meet customer needs resulting from the extraordinary
cold 1976-77 winter.

107.

"Life-line" rates are artificially low rates on. a fixed level of energy consumption,

designed to assure all users-regardless of income-a minimum affordable energy supply.
Life-line rates have been implemented on at least an experimental basis in a number of
states on either gas, electricity, or both.
108. NEP, supra note 67, at 95.
109. For example, in many cases large capacity industrial use of electricity costs less
than residential use due to the ability to take power at a high load factor.
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processes for which gas has a "form value" over and above its heating content. 110 For these uses it may be less expensive to pay a premium price for gaseous fuels than to replace existing equipment or
redesign the manufacturing process.
Unquestionably, coal gas would be far less expensive for residential users than electricity (whether generated from coal or nuclear
fuels). For example, Pacific Gas & Electric Company estimates that
new coal-fired electric service will cost its residential consumers between $12.90 (for space heating) and $18.80 (for clothes dryers) per
million BTU's.'1 ' Coal gas, however, would cost roughly half as much
or $6.28 for space heating. Other studies estimate that the cost ad2
vantage of coal gas is even greater."
In addition, although capital costs for coal gasification are high,
they are only half what is required for comparable coal-fired electricity generating capacity. 11 3 Even LNG importation, which requires
extensive capital investment in liquefaction facilities, specially constructed tankers and receiving terminals, appears significantly less
capital intensive than electricity." 4 In view of the scarcity of capital
available for energy development, this is a significant factor weighing against expanding electricity capacity in place of gaseous substitutes.
Resource Efficiency. Central station generation of electricity,
whether from coal or nuclear fuels, is inherently an inefficient use of
resources due to the need to convert the heat generated through combustion into electrical energy." 5 The NEP recognized as much, noting
110. Such "process" gas use is defined by the FPC as "gas use for which alternate fuels
are not technically feasible such as in anrlications requiring precise temperature controls
and precise flame characteristics." 18 C.F.R. § 2.78(c) (8)
(1976). It has been. estimated
that natural gas is used in over 25,000 industrial applications, including such diverse operations as food preparation, soldering, brazing, and fabric finishing. See 5 FED. POWER
COMM'N, NATIONAL GAS SURVEY 309 (1975).

111. James K. A. Harral, A Fossil Fuel Choice-to Manufacture Gas or Generate Electricity (Feb. 1976) (paper presented to the American Institute of Mining Engineers meeting In Las Vegas, Nevada). Due to the relatively higher efficiency of electricity for cooking, the cost advantage of coal gas for that application, although substantial, is not
as great.
112. Several recent studies can be summarized as follows:

PG&E
AGA

Cost of Useful Energy Consumed for Residential
End-Use (dollars per million BTU)
Coal Gas
Electrio
$6.28-13.97
12.90-18.80
$6.95
14.68

DOE
$5.00
10.00
It should be emphasized that although these estimates employ differing assumptions, they
all give a large cost advantsge to coal vss over electricity.
113. Capital costs for 250,000 MMBTU per day are estimated at $1.3 billion for coal
gasification and $2.7 billion for coal-fired generating capacity. See, e.g., AM. GAS. A.
COMMERCIALIZING HiGi-i-BTU COAL GASIFICATION: THE RATIONALE FOR IMMEDIATE AcTION

13-14

(1977).

Nuclear plants tend to be even more capital

intensive than conventional

generating facilities.
114. In DOE On. No. 1, simra note 41. capital costs are estimated at roughly $2 billion
for a 'roject to Import over 500.000 MMBTU per day.
115. A good explanation written for the layman is contained in Commoner, A Reporter
At Large: Eirerqat, NEW YORKR, Feb. 2. 9, & 16, 1976. See also Lovins, Energy Strategy:
The Road Not Taken, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Oct. 1976).
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as follows: "To the extent that electricity is substituted for oil and
gas, the total amounts of energy used in the country will be somewhat
larger due to the inherent inefficiency of electricity generation and
distribution. But conserving scarce oil and natural gas is far more
important than saving coal." 116
In a policy whose watchwords are conservation and efficient use
of resources, more attention should be paid to making efficient use
of all resources, including coal. Indeed, in view of the adverse environmental and social impacts associated with increased coal production, every effort must be made to use coal output efficiently.
Several studies-including those done under federal auspicesconclude that coal gasification is a much more efficient use of coal
than electricity generation. DOE has estimated, for example, that a
high BTU coal gasification plant producing 250,000 MM BTU per day
would require some 8.3 million tons of coal per year, while roughly
9.3 millon tons per year, or 12 percent more, would be required to
11 7
produce comparable amounts of usable electric energy.
The inefficiency of electricity generation as compared to coal
gasification is confirmed by the Final Environmental Impact Study
published by FEA on the use of liquid petroleum feedstocks for SNG
manufacture. While the overall thermal efficiency of coal gas (before
end-use) is estimated at approximately 50 percent, the overall efficiency for coal-fired electricity is 25 percent. 1 8
Environmental Impact. A fundamental principle of the NEP is
that national energy policy should maintain protection of the environment. 119 While recognizing that every energy source has its disadvantages, the NEP states that it is necessary to recognize hazards and
risks and "to reduce them to relatively low levels.' 2 0 Indeed, the
plan explicitly declares: "The Administration intends to achieve its
energy goals without endangering the public health or degrading the

environment.'

'121

Increased generation of electricity is unlikely to best achieve
these goals. As explained above, the generation of electricity is an
inherently inefficient use of energy resources. But not only does coal
116.
117.

NEP, supra note 67, at xiii.
Prospects for Coal Gasification Information Memorandum, supra note 91 at app. C.

A similar analysis

prepared by AGA estimates annual

coal requirements

to be 8 million

tons for coal gas and 11.5 million for coal-fired electricity. AM. GAS. A., COMMERCIALIZING
HIGH-BTU
118.
MENT

COAL GASIFICATION: THE RATIONALE FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION 14 (April 1977).
ED. ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEON THE ALLOCATION OF PETROLEUM FEEDSTOCKS TO SYNTHETIC NATURAL GAS PLAN-rs

8.1-3 to 8.1-5 (1977). In fact, the overall efficiencies of all methods of synthesizing gas
are well above the efficiencies of electricity generation, prompting the report to conclude
that: "Regardless of generation method, electrcity is the least efficient source of energy,

with an overall thermal efficiency between
added).
119. NEP, supra note 67, at 27.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 67.

18 and 28 percent."

Id.

at 8.3-1

(emphasis
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electrification consume coal inefficiently, it also requires huge quantities of water which is a particularly scarce and valuable resource in
many parts of the West where coal will be utilized. Coal-fired generating capacity sufficient to produce 250,000 MM BTU per day would
require over 30,000 acre-feet of water per year, roughly 500 percent
more than a comparable capacity coal gasification facility. 122 Moreover, the coal-fired electric facilities would produce seventy times
as much sulfur dioxide per hour. 1 23 Sulfur dioxide emissions could be
cut to only seven times as much sulfur as for comparable gasification capacity, but at the cost of increasing water requirements sub2 4
stantially.'
While a similar direct comparison of coal gas with nuclear-fired
generating capacity cannot be made due to the different fuels involved, rapidly expanding nuclear capacity obviously carries environmental risks, particularly concerning the still unresolved questions
of plutonium reprocessing and waste disposal.
The environmental impact of other sources of supplemental gas
supplies are generally less than for coal gasification. 12 5 Indeed, it
may be that gasification of organic wastes could produce a net benefit in terms of undesirable waste products imposed on the environment.
Impact On American Society. The wisdom of shifting to electricity generation should also be assessed in terms of its disruptive impact on American society. The recent phenomenon of coal "boom
towns" in Colorado, Montana, and other Western states may be but
a foretaste of the disruptive impact of nearly doubling coal production by 1985. This potential for disrupting settled communities makes
it all the more imperative that coal be used as efficiently as possible.
As noted above, the use of coal in electricity generating facilities
does not meet this standard.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The preceeding discussion is not intended to conclusively rebut
the Carter Administration's energy proposals. It does serve, however,
to illustrate the fact that the prior policies concerning gaseous fuels,
as developed by the FPC and the FEA, even as revised and refined
by the Carter Administration, are founded on factual assumptions
which are open to serious question. An energy strategy built on such
a dubious and untested foundation runs a grave risk of being resource
122. Prospects for Coal Gasification Information Memorandum, supra note 91, at app. C.
123. Id.
124. Addition of limestone scrubber would also more than double solid' wastes.
125. Even imi-orted LNG, the gas resource with the greatest potential for adverse environmental impact due to potential safety risks associated with transporting gas in liquid
form, carries no risks of long-term impact that is comparable, for example, to nuclear
waste products.
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inefficient, unduly costly to the consumer and the environment, and
directly contrary to the Administration's overriding policy goals.
With these basic policy goals in mind, this final section attempts to
identify the fundamental problems now faced in formulating a policy
for gaseous fuels which is factually sound and politically acceptable. In
so doing, we sketch the outlines of an alternative regulatory mode
which the DOE could adopt to preserve the option of a. viable and
dynamic future role for the interstate gas industry.
A. THE

PROBLEM SUMMARIZED

The fundamental problem at the present stage in energy policy
formation is that the factual predicateunderlying the various assumptions and influencing policy choices has never been aired in a public
forum where it can be probed and tested for consistency, accuracy,
and completeness. While this may be a surprising conclusion in light
of the extensive public debate over "the energy crisis," it is more
readily understandable in light of the prior history of regulation.
Up until 1977, the entire natural gas policy-making process under
the FPC proceeded by fits and starts, with no real consciousness of
the need to have a generic policy to be applied in particular cases.
The fundamental probelm at that time was the lack of an institutional
structure capable of dealing with the policy problems. Dealing with
the various issues on a case-by-case basis, the FPC generally opted
for policies which at best did little to encourage expanded !service
and at worst, actively discouraged it. In part, this may have been
due to a prudently conservative approach to the problem of load
growth. But the no growth attitude implicit in so many of the Commission's actions stemmed as well from the statutorily mandated
formal adjudicatory procedures. Typically, the Commission was presented by the industry with a specific project and exercised a vetolike power, either approving or disapproving the application. Although
the Commission had ample authority to modify proposals or impose
conditions on certificates, this was no substitute for an active, planning posture taken at the outset. In effect, the procedural and adversary process requirements of the Natural Gas Act placed the FPC in
a passive and reactive posture.
This approach carried serious disadvantages. When each aspect
of the supply puzzle was examined separately, in detail, and under
adjud'c-tory procedures designed to allow for equal participation by
all intereSted parties, the focus tended to be on the defects and disadvantages of each proposal. While this phenomenon may frequently
occur when policy-making authority is fractured among different
agencies, it may also arise when related issues are dealt with separately by a single agency. The constraint of judicial review based
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on the "substantial evidence" standard also exaggerated the negative
aspects of each policy alternative, since disappointed parties were
sure to focus judicial attention on the defects of the Commission's
actions. In brief, formal adjudicatory procedures conferred disproportionate weight on the "nay sayers."
The Commission's jurisdiction, narrowly focused on the interstate gas transmission companies, was never broad enough to permit
the FPC to gather the data required for informed policymaking. The
press of dealing with the day-to-day workload of rate and certificate
matters also made long-range policy planning a difficult process.
In addition, the FPC was cut off almost entirely from the Executive
Branch, making policy coordination even more difficult. This bifurcated institutional structure was exacerbated by the creation of the
FEA in 1974.126 The half-hearted attempt to coordinate policy through
the Energy Resources Council was unlikely to succeed from the outset since the Council had no functional responsibilities. In administrative Washington, such "blue-ribbon" consulting bodies, lacking budgetary clout and a political constituency, tend to be institutional "lightweights."
With the creation of the Department of Energy in 1977, the institutional prerequisite for rational policymaking was set in place. The
FPC, rechristened the FERC, was folded into a relatively independent
niche within the new department, as were the FEA and large portions
of the Energy Research & Development Administration (ERDA).
While the DOE Organization Act clearly intends for the FERC to
retain its independence as an adjudicative administrative tribunal,
it is equally clear that Congress intended for the Commission to be
far more -intimately involved in policy coordination than in the past.
Indeed, Congress apparently intended to make the FERC the primary
forum for public input into the policymaking process as it impacts on
the natural gas consumer. For example, under Section 404 (a) of the
DOE Act,'127 the Commission, in its discretion, may determine whether
126.. Thus, while the FPC was concerned with allocating shrinking natural gas supplies
and seeking to encourage some alternative sources of supply, the FEA was acting to preclude the use of naphtha and other liquid feedstocks for use in manufacturing synthetic
gas.
127. The Section in full reads as follows:
REFERRAL OF OTHER RULEMAKING PROCEEDINGS TO COMMISSION
SEC. 404(a) Except as provided in section 403, whenever the Secretary proposes to prescribe rules, regulations, and statements of policy or general applicability in the exercise of any function which is transferred to the Secretary under section 301 of this Act, he shall notify the Commission of the
proposed action. If the Commission, in its discretion, determines within such
period as the Secretary may prescribe, that the proposed action may significantly affect any function within the jurisdction of the Commission pursuant to section 402(a)(1), (b), and (c)(1), the Secretary shall immediately refer the matter to the Commission, which shall provide an opportunity for public comment.
(b) Following such opportunity for public comment the Commission,
after consultation with the Secretary, shall either-
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any proposed rule, regulation, or statement of policy issued by the
Secretary "significantly affect[s] any function within the jurisdic-

rion of the Commission" under inter alia the "core" sections of the
Natural Gas Act. If the Commission makes such a determination, the
Secretary "shall immediately refer the matter to the Commission,
which shall provide an opportunity for public comment." Section
404 (a). Following the comment procedure, the Commission i's directed
to "consult" with the Secretary and then either concur with the proposal, recommend changes or modifications, or recommend that the
proposal be dropped entirely. 128 The Secretary must either follow the
recommendations of the Commission in all respects, or order that
1 29
the rule not be issued.
The Commission's authority to act on its own initiative in this
area is made explicit by Section 403 which authorizes the FERC to
propose rules and statements of general applicability with respect to
"any" function within the Commission's jurisdiction under Section
402.130 Moreover, Section 403 (b) provides that the Commission shall

DOE
128.
129.
130.

(1) concur in adoption of the rule or statement as proposed by the Secretary ;
(2) concur in adoption of the rule or statement only with such changes
as it may recommend; or
(3) recommend that the rule or statement not be adopted.
The Commission shall promptly publish its recommendations, adoptedl under
this subsection, along with an explanation of the reason for its actions and
an analysis of the major comments, criticisms, and alternatives offered
during the comment period.
(c) Following publication of the Commission's recommendations the Secretary shall have the option of(1) issuing a final rule or statement in the form initially proposed by
the Secretary if the Commission has concurred in such rule pursuant to
subsection (b) (1) ;
(2) issuing a final rule or statement In amended form so that the rule
conforms in all respects with the changes proposed by the Commission If
the Commission has concurred in such rule or statement pursuant to subsection (b) (2) ; or
(3) ordering that the rule shall not be issued.
The action taken by the Secretary pursuant to this subsection shall constitute a final agency action for purposes of section 704 of title 5, United States
Code.
Organization Act, supra note 14, at § 404.
Id. at § 404(b),.
Id. at § 404(c).
§ 403 reads as follows:
INITIATION OF RULEMAKING PROCEEDINGS BEFORE COMMISSION
SEC. 403(a) the Secretary and the Commission are authorized to propose
rules, regulatons and statements of general applicability with respect to any
function within the jurisdiction of the Commission under section 402 of this
Act.
(b)
The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to any proposal made under subsection (a), and shall consider and take final action on
any proposal made by the Secretary under any subsection, in an expeditious
manner in accordance with such reasonable time limits as may be set forth by
the Secretary for the completion of action by the Commission on any such
proposal.
(c) Any function described in section, 402 of this Act which relates to the
etablishment of rates and charges under the Federal Power Act or the
Natural Gas Act, may be conducted by rule-making procedures. Except as
providel in subsection (d), the procedures in such a rulemaking proceeding shall assure full consideration of the issues and an opportunity for interested persons to present their views.
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have "exclusive jurisdiction" with respect to any such proposal. And
of course, the FERC retains the authority granted by Section 14 (a)

of the Natural Gas Act to investigate any facts to aid in enforcing the
act or in order to obtain "information to serve as a basis for recom131
mending further legislation to the Congress.1
Finally, the Secretary is empowered by Section 402 (e) 132 to assign
virtually any matter to the Commission, after public notice, thereby
conferring jurisdiction on the FERC to hear and determine the mat3
ter.1
In brief, the Carter Administration, while succeeding in creating

an institutional structure capable of gathering and digesting the information necessary for a national and well-grounded energy policy,
has failed to utilize the administrative apparatus for the purposes for
which it was created. Instead, the proposed National Energy Act was
prepared in an overly hasty process prior to passage of the DOE Organization Act, and with almost no input from the great number of
industry, environmental, and consumer groups with vital interests in
the outcome. It is thus not surprising that the proposed legislation
antagonized more than it pleased and ran into serious difficulties in
the Congress.
(d) With respect to any rule or regulation promulgated by the Commission
to establish rates and charges for the first sale of natural gas by a producer
or gatherer to a natural gas pipeline under the Natural Gas Act, the Commission may afford any interested person a reasonable opportunity to submit
written questions with respect to disputed issues of fact to other interested
persons participating in the rulemaking proceedings. The Commission may
establish reasonable time for both the submission of questions and responses
thereto.
Id. at § 403.
131.
15 U.S.C. § 717m. Under § 402(a) (2) (B), the FERC was granted all powers exercised by the FPC under, inter alia, § 14 of the Natural Gas Act.
132. § 402(e) provides as follows:
"In addition to the other provisions of this section, the Commission shall have jurisdiction
over any other matter which the Secretary may assign to the Commission after public
notice, or which are required to be referred to the Commission pursuant to section 404
of this Act." DOE Organization Act, supra note 14, at § 402 (e). It also bears noting
that the FERC has jurisdiction over any other matter required by law to be made 'on
the record after an opportunity for an agency hearing," or which the Energy Secretary
determines ought to be. § 402(d) provides that:
(d) The Commission shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any other
matter arising under any other function of the Secretary(1) involving any agency determination required by law to be made on the
reccrd after an opportunity for an agency hearing; or
(2) involving any other agency determination which the Secretary determines shall be made on the record after an opportunity for an agency hearinz, except that nothing in this subsection shall require the functions under
Sections 105 and 106 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act shall be
within the jurisdiction of the Commission unless the Secretary assigns such
a fnction to the Commission.
Id. at § 402 (d). Judging from these provisions, the FERC may be the primary forum
for pubdlie input with respect to policy Initiatives of the De-artment concerning any fuel
It remains to be s'en how these provisions will be used in practice.
1.33. It is not entirely clear what procedural model will govern these various types of
adminssratir'e nrocedinzs since the relevant provisions of Titles TV and V of the DOE
1
Act are an '
,s on this point. Compare, for example, $ 403(c) with 3 403(d). Except
for those proedi-'as
for which f1,l
and formal adjudicatory nrocedures are required
(e.g.. for matters required to be made "on the record after an opportunity for an agency
hea'ing"). the Commission is probably free to develon more flexible procedures. in view
of the FPC's earlier attempts to develop such "hybrid" procedures, the FERC may be
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The difficulties encountered on Capitol Hill were compounded by
the lack of sound data and projections on which to base the policies
which the Administration proposed to adopt. On what basis was the
assumption made that traditional gas supplies will continue to drop
precipitously in 1977 and thereafter, when available indicators point
to a slight upwards trend? On what basis was it assumed that traditional supplies of natural gas cannot be gradually supplemented by
alternative sources? On what basis was the decision made that the
generation of electricity from coal should be preferred to the manufacture of synthetic gas from coal? Answers to these and similar
questions are crucially important to assessing and justifying proposed
energy policies for the future-yet they have never been tested in
an appropriate forum.
B. A

PROPOSED SOLUTION

A primary deficiency of the Carter Administration's policy proposals, as demonstrated above, is the lack of a factually supported
consensus on the supply potential or viability of different sources of
supplemental supplies of gaseous fuels. DrE has both the authority
and the duty to fill this fundamental gap
its information base. The
Department should therefore utilize its L.isting statutory authority
to initiate an "on-the-record" proceeding in which policy assumptions
affecting the appropriate role of gas in the nation's energy future
may be laid bare and underlying factual assertions opened to challenge and rebuttal.
The forum for such a novel proceeding should be the FERC. As
noted above, the Commission has the authority under the Natural
Gas Act and the DOE Organization Act to conduct such a proceeding,
either on its own intitiative or upon request by the Energy Secretary.
The function of the proceeding should be (a) to test the validity of
the "underlying assumptions" discussed above and (b) to generate
the factual foundation necessary for informed judgments on the proper
role of gas in meeting the nation's expanding energy requiremerits.
Having conducted such an inquiry, both FERC and DOE could then
reassess their respective policies, regulations, and legislative recommendations affecting the interstate gas industry's load growth possibilities and make such changes as are indicated.
Such a proceeding could be framed as a response to Section 801
of the DOE Act, requiring the President to submit to the Congress,
not later than April 1, 1979 (and biennially thereafter), a National
expected to continue the process, evolving an approach which provides for maximum
public input without unduly tying up the decision-making process in formal evidentiary
hearings. For a discussion of the FPC's hybrid procedures in the curtailment area, sce
\VILLnICH, A.DMINISTRATION OF ENERGY SHORTAGES: N\ATURAL GAS AND PETROLEUM 77-102
(1976).
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Energy Policy Plan. 13 4 This legislation provides for the Plan to
establish objectives, identify strategies to be followed to achieve such
objectives, 35 and recommend necessary legislative and administrative actions to aid in achieving the goals set out. 138 In addition, the
plan must include a report containing "whatever data and analysis
are necessary" to support the objectives and policy recommendations
set forth, as well as a "review and appraisal" of technologies, pro13 7
cedures, and practices employed to achieve the purpose of the Plan.
Even if the proceeding were conducted outside the context of the
required review process, it has several distinct advantages over present policymaking procedures. First, and most importantly, it provides
for public participation and on-the-record discussion of the pros and
cons of various alternatives to meeting the demand for gaseous fuels.
The Carter Administration proposals were developed without the
benefit of significant public input and have suffered as a result, both
in terms of substantive accuracy and political acceptability. National
energy policy, impacting on virtually every segment of American
society, involves countless important political decisions and judgments, which are necessarily outside the parameters of computer
models used by government planners. Especially when there is no
consensus on the underlying facts and assumptions, policymaking in
a democracy requires broad opportunities for public participation.
No such meaningful opportunity was provided in the formulation of
the Carter Administration's energy legislation.
Second, conducting a fact-finding and consensus-building proceeding prior to making concrete legislative proposals will help to avoid
"locking in" certain technological choices-and excluding otherson the basis of very preliminary indications of which proposals have
the greatest merit. The advantages and disadvantages of each alternative should be debated from the standpoints of economics, resource
efficiency, environmental non-degradation, adverse social impact,
and national security. In light of the tremendous diversity of supplyenhancing strategies for gaseous fuels 'that appear to be, or may
soon become, technically and commercially feasible, there is an overriding need for a regulatory framework which encourages the exploration of as many options as possible. There is a real risk, however,
that a regulatory policy aimed at restricting growth in gaseous fuels
may put an end to the burgeoning innovation now underway. Thus a
crucial issue which the proceeding must address is how to avoid eliminating long-term options during the time needed for research, development, and assessing actual commercialization of the various alter134.
135.
136.
137.

DOE Organization Act, supra note 14, at § 801.
Id. at § 801(b) (1).
Id. at § 801(b) (2).
Ld. at § 801(c).
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natives. To a far greater degree than is usually acknowledged, the
problem of alternative energy sources-for gaseous fuels as well as
for other forms of energy-is that of finding the least costly mix
of long-term supply alternatives; thus the problem involves at least
as large a component of the economics of competing processes as it
does of available physical resources themselves. For example, in
reconciling short-term and long-term policy, federal regulation should
not allow the present enormous investment in gas transmission and
distribution facilities (as well as in gas-fired furnaces and appliances)
to atrophy due to lack of sufficient supplies over the near term.
Third, despite its fairly limited experience with the more exotic
gas substitutes, the FERC has a large staff with broad expertise in
regulating the natural gas industry. In terms of evaluating the impact
of various policy alternatives on the interstate gas consumer, it is
probably wisest to rely on the agency with the greatest expertise in
the general area, supplemented when necessary by experts from other
branches of the Department. The ERA staff, for example, would presumably be the Secretary's delegate for presenting his views in such
13 8
a proceeding.
Finally, the FERC is the only energy agency with an explicit and
long-standing primary obligation to protect the interstate natural gas
consumer. As stated by the Supreme Court in the CATCO decision,
"[t]he [Natural Gas] Act was so framed as to afford consumers
a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection ... .
If the Commission is to discharge its duties under the Natural Gas
Act, it thus must take a far more active role in developing energy
policies which impact significantly on the interstate gas consumer.1 40
Today's natural gas consumer may be tomorrow's biogas consumer;
FERC should recognize that fact in discharging its statutory duty
under the Natural Gas Act.
One of the primary legislative purposes in creating the DOE was
"to provide for a mechanism through which a coordinated national
energy policy can be formulated and implemented. ' ' 141 All branches
of DOE are thus charged with responsibility for furthering the national
138. By paragraph 19 of DOE Delegation Order No. 0204-4, the Secretary designated
the Administrator of the ERA as his delegate for intervening or otherwise participating
in proceedings before the FERC. 42 Fed. Reg. 60726, 60727 (1977).
129. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959).
140. The primary disadvantage of relying on the FERC as the forum of the landmark
proceeding described above is the risk that the review process may be delayed by formal
procedural requirements of the Natural Gas Act. As pointed out above, the statutory requirement of adjudicative proceedings has been a significant difficulty in the past. However, in v'ew of the expanded jurisdiction and powers conferred by §§ 402, 403, and 404
of the DOE Act-especially with respect to informal rulemaking authority-it appears
that the rew Commission may no longer be required to follow the adjudicative model
in all proceedings before it. While adjudication would still be required for the resolution
of contested cases, more flexible procelures could probably be used in performing data
gathering and policymaking functions. See supra note 133.
141. DOE Organization Act, supra note 14, at § 102 (3).
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interest in the creation and application of a sound energy policy. Accordingly, it is incumbent on the FERC to take the initiative to examine the factual foundations of proposed energy policies to insure
that the nation's interstate gas consumers are protected. Presumptively, this goal-the primary responsibility of the FERC under the
Natural Gas Act-will not be furthered by a policy which assumes
(and thus tends to bring about) the rapid depletion of U.S. gas supply
and which would maintain indefinitely the allocation of those supplies
by federal mandate.
C.

CONCLUSION

The most striking lesson that emerges from a study of federal
policies affecting interstate gas supplies is the realization of the extent to which the gas shortage has been institutionalized through
federal regulation. Beginning in the late 1960's, well before the "energy crisis" arrived, a variety of proposals were made to augment
flowing gas 'supplies. Yet none of the supplemental sources has been
allowed to make the contribution originally anticipated. The primary
reasons advanced in opposition have been (1) unacceptable environmental impact (LNG imports); (2) unacceptably high projected price
impacts on consumers, especially the residential and small commercial users (LNG imports, SNG, Mexican imports); (3) unacceptably
high level of dependence on foreign suppliers (LNG and Mexican imports, SNG); and (4) discrimination against other gas consumers
("finder's keepers", increased storage, fixed base periods in curtailment cases).
Today's political climate calls tor an ideal solution to energy
shortages-a non-polluting, perfectly safe, domestic fuel, which can
be provided in abundance and at a relatively low cost. But while Washington waits for the perfect replacement fuel to come along, the interstate gas industry is faced with eroding markets, diminished supplies
and regulatory disapprovals or delay that cripple proposed new supply sources. The existing interstate gas consumer is burdened with
supply interruptions and rapidly increasing rates, while the potential
consumer is forced to rely on more expensive, less efficient and more
polluting fuels.
Unless radically modified, federal policy will tend to ensure that
gas shortages continue indefinitely, while available supplies continue
to be allocated under federal supervision. More likely than not, the
continuing "gas shortage" will become a self-fulfilling prophecy confirming government decision-makers in their view that electricity
and the direct use of coal are the best answers to the nation'.s expanding energy needs.
The Department of Energy has the opportunity and the resources
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to review existing policies along the lines discussed above and to
utilize regulatory powers to examine the factual basis for proposed
policies rather than following the untested assumptions of an isolated
group of government planners. Failure to reexamine the "accepted
wisdom" underlying existing policies may impose significant and unnecessary costs on the economy and the environment generallyas well as on the captive interstate gas consumer.

